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CHAPTER I
FRANCE AFTER THE FALL
Following the military defeat of France in June, 1940 and the sub­
sequent signing of the Franco-German Armistice on 22 June, 1940, the newly- 
formed government of Marshall Henri Philippe Petain^ faced grave problems. 
From the end of June, 1940 to the beginning of 1941, these problems and 
the ramous manifestations of them demanded solution or, at the very least, 
alleviation for the immediate survival of France.
These exigencies were of two basic types. The first chronologically 
was the problem of a breakdown of relations with Great Britain. But the 
most urgently pressing was the problem of adjusting to and compensating 
for the enormous material, territorial, human, and psychological losses 
of the disastrous war with the Third Reich. Three-fifths of France, in­
cluding the more industrialized Northern and Western areas, with all their 
productive capabilities, were lost to the Germans and physically occupied
4
Marshall Henri Philippe Petain (1856-1951), French General and pol­
itician. Became a French national hero during W.W.I. In the interwar 
years Petain served as Commander-inChief of Morocco (1925-26), Minister 
of War (1-934), and Ambassador to Spain (1939-40). He became linked with 
right-wing political extremists and displayed contempt for French Parl­
iamentary democracy. Served as Vice-Premier in Reynaud government and 
was designated to form a new government after the fall of France. He be­
came head of the Vichy government on 10 July, 19^0 and presided over the 
"national revolution" which made France an authoritarian state. Tried and 
convicted after the war for collaborating with Germany and sentenced to 
hang. His sentence was commuted by De Gaulle and he died in prison in 1951.
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by the Wehrmacht. In addition to the Frenchmen killed in the war, the
loss of over two million people interned as German prisoners of war fur-
ther incapacitated the French economy. German control of the lines of
commercial communications and traffic still further limited the economic
2viability of the unoccupied zone. Massive problems of unemployment, ref­
ugee disposition, physical rebuilding, and moral regeneration arose from
3the rubble of the French defeat. These were all internal problems and 
had to be dealt with as such.
The dominating force in this internal policy area was the Franco- 
German Armistice, for through it, the victorious Germans held all the keys 
necessary to unlock the chest of possible solutions. Although not corny 
pletely destroying the independence of action of the Vichy government , 
the Armistice sufficiently limited the possibilities for action so that 
the Vichy government had at best "half liberty” to deal with its internal 
problems.^ If the government of Petain were to prove foolish enough to 
act too independently of or contrary to the Armistice, the Germans had the 
right, as provided by Article XXIV of the Armistice, of removing what ad­
vantages the French had accrued through the terms of the Armistice, and 
of resuming active hostilities, for which'the badly defeated French were
2Adrienne Doris Hytier, Two Years of French Foreign Policy: Vichy 
19^0-19^2.(Paris: Librarie Minard, 1958), pp. 1^-15. Hereafter cited as 
Hytier, F.F.P.
3Ibid.. p. 77.
h.Vichy is a resort town located on the Alliers River approximately 
200 miles south of Paris. It was chosen as the seat of government, after 
a brief stop in Clermant-Ferrand, primarily because of its many hotels.
^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 13.
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in no way prepared. So dominating was the Armistice that its
shadow loomed over all negotiations between the two states 
and all initial discussions dealt with the armistice and the 
modification of its terms. It permeated Germany's foreign 7 
policy toward France in influenced every facet of French life.
Relations with the Germans on questions dealing with the problems 
of France's economic, physical, and spiritual rebuilding became, in the 
days immediately following the signing of the Arraistice, the most urgent 
need of the Petain government. In these early days the only means of 
contact with the Germans was through the Armistice Commission, estab­
lished by Article XXII of the Armistice, at Wiesbaden, Germany. The 
function of the Armistice Commission was to "...settle and control the 
carrying out of the armistice convention" and act "according to the in-
g
structions of the German High Command." The supreme power on the German
side was, then, the Military High Command, or the O.K.W. German policy
9was to be formulated in and by the eight subcommittees , all presided over 
by appropriate representatives of the Third Reich, and consequently to be 
implemented by the military administration.**^ The stated mission of the
^By the terms of the Armistice (IV, V, VI, VII, IX, and XIII) France 
was left with almost no war materiel. French troops were also disarmed 
and demobilized. Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 15.
^William J. Potts, The German-French Armistice of June 19^0. and the 
German Armistice Commission. 19^-0-19^2 (unpublished M.A. thesis, University 
of Montana, 1966), p. 26. Hereafter cited as Potts, Armistice.
8Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 111.
^The eight subcommittees were Land, Air, and Naval Forces, Trans­
missions, War Prisoners, War Industries, Foreign Affairs, and Press. Potts, 
Armistice. p. 32.
*°Amold Lissance, ed., The Private War Journal of Franz Haider. Mimeo­
graphed, Cory #26 University of Montana Library, Vol, TV., p. 104. Here­
after cited as Haider, Journal.
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military administration was to "establish calm and order in the French 
occupied territories" and to utilize "the resources of the country for 
the needs of the Wehrmacht and the economy of the German war. The 
French delegation to the Armistice Commission, whose task it was to nego­
tiate with the Germans for solutions to the problems of occupied France,
was called the Delegation Franjaise pour 1'Armistice, or simply the D.F.A.,
12and was headed by General Charles Huntziger. The D.F.A. was composed
of seventy members, each assigned to the committee relating to his special
13area of expertise, J This delegation, like its German counterpart, received
its instructions from and was responsible to a military authority, in this
case the Direction des Services de 1'Armistice, or the D.S.A., created by
14and under the dominion of General Maxime Weygand, the Minister of National
Defense. The D.S.A. in turn acted on the orders of and recommendations
from the "conseil restreint," a sort of mini-cabinet consisting of Petain
16and his closest advisors. Ultimately, then, the real authority of the 
D.F.A. emanated from the Marshal himself.
**Pottsf Armistice, p. 31.
12General Charles Huntziger was the commander of the Second French 
Army at the time of the Fall. Headed Armistice negotiations and signed 
the Armistice. Minister of War and chief delegate to the Armistice Commission.
l33ytier, F.F.P.. p. 112.
^General Maxime Weygand was b o m  in I867, possibly the son of Max- 
imillian I of Mexico. Attended St. Cyr. Chief of Staff to Foch (1914-23). 
High Commissioner in Syria (1923-24), A m y  Chief of Staff (1931-35), retired 
until 1939. Then Commander-in-Chief Middle East until May, 1940 when he 
was made Supreme Commander of the French Any. Signed Armistice. Minister 
of National Defense in Vichy government until 1942, then became Governor 
General of Algeria. Acquitted of collaboration charges after the war.
l5Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 113.
16Ibid.. p. ?1.
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The negotiations at Wiesbaden formed the major part of the foreign 
relations of Vichy France with Germany in terms of volume. More important 
contacts were made,.however, and it was through these that the major dip­
lomatic activities of Germany and Vichy France were conducted. In addition 
to its relations with Germany the relations of Vichy France with the outer 
world, and particularly with Great Britain, comprised an important and, 
perhaps of more far-reaching impact, secondary facet of its foreign policy.
After the signing of the Armistice Vichy France did maintain diplo­
matic relations with other nations. The most important area of non-German 
oriented foreign policy was Franco-British relations. During the months 
immediately prior to the signing of the Armistice, France’s relations with 
Britain had become increasingly strained. The main reason for this growing 
animosity were Britain’s inadequate and suspect military aid in the Battle 
of France and her subsequent attitudes regarding the Armistice.
As the military disaster was unfolding in France animosity toward the 
British was growing apace. A frequently used example of the British reluc­
tance to commit themselves sincerely to the Battle of France was their 
action regarding the Battle of Arras on 23-24 May, in which the British
troops stopped their advance and began their retreat to the sea, thereby
17dooming the desperate plan to reconnect the defensive line. This episode 
served to- confirm the French suspicions that the British desired only to 
retreat and save themselves. , The fact that the French were not informed 
of the plans for the evacuation at Dunkirk until fully a week after the 
British orders had been issued still further widened the plysical and moral
l7Hvtier. F.F.P.. pp. 28-29.
6
18gap between the allies. The disproportionately high percentage of
British troops evacuated evacuated, a situation that was only partially.
remedied when Churchill ordered a prolongation of the operation to evacuate
more Frenchmen, added to the growing French animosity toward and suspicion
of the British.*^
Britain’s poor military performance led many in France to feel that
Britain had forfeited the right to hold France ot the terms of the Treaty
of 28 March, 19^0, the latest military agreement between France and Great 
20Britain. One of the main terms of this agreement was that neither party 
would seek a unilateral cessation of hostilities without the full and com­
plete accord of the other party. This clause was to become the focus of 
the most important controversy in Franco-British relations immediately 
prior to the signing of the Armistice. Also in evidence was the growing 
French suspicion that Britain had abandoned its commitment in hopes of
21seeking a compromise peace with Hitler’s Reich at the expense of France.
Disagreement over the former point dominated Franco-British relations from
22Dunkirk to Rethondes.
^Hvtier.' F.F.P.. pp. 28-29.
*^By 31 May about ten times as many British as French had been evacuated. 
By 4 June the ratio had dropped to two to one with about 120,000 Frenchmen 
evacuated. Ibid.. p. 30.
^Maurice Gargon, ed., Le Proces du Marechal Petain (Paris: Editions 
Alton Michel,' 19^5)* Vol. I, p. 181 Hereafter cited as Gargon, P.M. .
^Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York: MacMillan Co. 1948), Vol. I, p. 7?6. 
Hereafter cited as Hull, Memoirs.
22Rethondes was the site of the signing of the Franco-German Armistice, 
the same site of the signing of the Armistice of I9I8. William L. Shirer,
The Collapse of the Third Republic (New York: Simon and Schuster, 19&9)» 
pp. 878-879. Hereafter cited as Shirer, Collapse.
7
A fluriy of demands, conditions, proposals and counterproposals, 
misrepresentations, and misinterpretations marked the climax of this con­
troversy on 13-16 June. The series started at a Supreme Council meeting 
at Tours on 13 June from which emerged.a statement from Churchill sup­
posedly freeing France from her obligations and giving her the right to
sue for an armistice. The misinterpretation was fostered by the then
23Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Paul Baudouin, who later
became Foreign Minister at Vichy. Neglecting Churchill's demands for-
guarantees concerning the French fleet, Baudouin repeated only Churchill's
statements of profound sympathy for the French. Baudouin*s version was
accepted by his colleagues since Churchill failed to attend a French Cabinet
2hmeeting on the same day as he had planned.
On 15 June the French government sent a telegram to London asking
British permission to inquire, through the United States, about an arm-
25istice with the Germans. At this time, on 16 June, the British, seeing 
that an armistice was a very probable necessity, sent two telegrams to 
the French agreeing to the inquiry if certain conditions regarding the
26safety of the French fleet were recognized and accepted by the French.
23Paul Baudouin was a member of the French Foreign Office prior to 
the collapse in June. He became the first foreign minister of the Vichy 
government and served in that capacity until he was replaced by Laval on 
28 October, 1S&0. Supposedly a Fascist, he nevertheless rejected Laval's 
position on collaboration and supported the more moderate one of Petain.
24Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 22. ,
2^Maj. General Sir Edward Spears, Assignment to Catastrophe. Vol. II:
The Fall of France. June 19^0 (New York: A.A.Wyn Inc., 1955)» p. 265. Here­
after cited as Spears, Fall.
2^Winston Churchill, The Second World Mar. Vol. II: Their Finest Hour 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 19̂ +9), p. 206. Hereafter cited as Churchill, 
Finest Hour.
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Had these telegrams been allowed to stand, with their provisions for sail­
ing the French fleet to British ports, they would have given the British 
a solid base for grievance against the armistice, at least in principle,
but they would also have removed France's main item of bargaining power
27in armistice discussions with the Axis. Neither contingency was allowed 
to develop, however, since the telegrams were withdrawn shortly after their 
reception, never having been seen by the French Cabinet.
In their place the British proposed the establishment of an "Indissoluble 
union" between France and Great Britain. This union would have provided 
for dual citizenship for and ownership by both nations reciprocally. The 
British intent, of course, was to keep the French fleet and empire, of 
which Britain would be co-owner, actively involved in the war.“ This = 
scheme was immediately rejected by the French who were unwilling to accept 
what would have amounted to dominion status in the British Commonwealth.
The telegrams of 16 June were then re-issued to the French but went unrec­
ognized by the French government. The British issued no formal protests,
so the feeling in France was that they accepted, at least tacitly, the
29idea of a Franco-German armistice.
On 16 June the leadership of the French government changed, and Marshal! 
P^tain, bent on sighing an armistice, replaced the more resolute Reynaud.
By 17 June the leaders of the new French government were issuing armistice 
inviting statements. On the same day Petain made statements in a radio
27Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 23.
28Spears, Fall, p. 292.
29Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 23.
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broadcast that could easily be misconstrued as orders for French troops
30to lay down their arms and cease all resistance. Finally, on 21 June, 
General Weygand received the preliminary terms for an armistice from Ger­
many. Given the military situation and Pdtain1 s determination to end 
hostilities, it was no surprise that the harsh terms were accepted. A
preliminary armistice was signed between France and Germany on 22 June,
3119^0. The British, having failed to prevent the signing, reacted immed­
iately.
On 23 June Sir Ronald Campbell, the British Ambassador, left his post
in France and returned to London. This amounted to a unilateral cessation
of high level diplomatic relations although neither France nor Great Bri-
32tain acknowledged it as such. The real fear of the British, that the 
French fleet would fall intact ot the Axis, seemed a distinct possibility, 
if not a probability. This fear was to manifest itself throughout the sum­
mer and autumn and measures to prevent it became the main tenet of British 
foreign policy toward France.
The French fleet, the only arm of the French military still intact 
at the time of the Armistice, was to become, in the negotiations succeeding 
the Armistice, the focal point of diplomatic contacts between Vichy France 
and Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, those between Vichy and the 
Third Reich. Article VIII of the Franco-German Armistice agreement provided
^Shirer, Collapse, pp. 850-85^.
3lIbid.. pp. 882-883, 88?.
^'Paul Farmer, Vichy: Political Dilemma (New York: Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1955), p. 182. Hereafter cited as Farmer, Dilemma.
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that
The French War Fleet, with the exception of the part 
left at the disposal of the Government for the protection 
of French interests in its colonial empire, -will be assembled 
in harbors to be determined and dismantled under the control 
of Germany and Italy, respectively, J
The vagueness and ambiguity of the terms was due, in a large part, 
to the German realization that they could not physically prevent the ac­
tivities of the fleet. To the chagrin of his Italian allies, Hitler re­
fused to dictate harsh terms for the fleet, wishing only to avoid its
34defection to the British, He further sought to prevent any pro-British
uprising on the part of the French fleet by offering to guarantee that it
would be fully restored to France upon the conclusion of peace. As he told*
Mussolini on 18 June, "Above all the French fleet must be prevented from
reaching England..." By demanding no drastic terms regarding the fleet,
35Hitler was, at this time, content to neutralize it. The German govern­
ment shortly thereafter issued a solemn promise to the French declaring 
that it had no intention of using "for its own purposes in the war, the 
French fleet which is in ports under German supervision..."
The Germans did, however, maintain some control over the fleet by 
requiring that French ships have the permission of the Armistice Com­
mission to leave metropolitan French ports. The price for this permission 
was reciprocal permission for the Germans to place consuls in French empire
33Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 14.
^Hugh Gibson, ed., The Ciano Diaries (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday &
Co. Inc., 1946), pp. 165-166. Hereafter cited as Ciano, Diaries.
35 <•Germany, Kriegsmarine Oberkommando, Fuhrer Conferences on Matters
Dealing with the German Navy (Washington: Office of Naval Intelligence,
1947), Vol. I, p. 35, Hereafter cited as O.K.K. Fuhrer Conf.
3^Shirer, Collapse, p. 880.
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37territories. This the French refused until the summer of 1$&2. Germany 
also required that all communication to French colonial naval bases from
O Q
the Vichy government be channeled through the Armistice Commission.
In spite of these provisions the French retained real control over
39the fleet until it was scuttled in November, 19^2. Throughout the per­
iod surrounding the Armistice negotiations the Frence leaders were cog­
nizant of the importance of the fleet, in relation to both German and
British interpretations and attitudes and their own needs. The Navy it-
40self, under the leadership of Admiral Jean Louis Xavier Francois Carlan,
the Minister of the Navy from June to December 19^0,^ was determined not
to be taken by the Axis. A series of orders to the fleet from Darlan
immediately prior to the signing of the Armistice serves witness to the
awareness of Vichy to the possible intentions of both Germany and Great
Britain. On 20 June Darlan instructed all naval stations and warships
that "whatever orders may be received, never abandon intact to the eneny 
42a combat vessel," and assured the fleet that "in no case will it be
37Gabriel Paul Auphan, "The French Merchant Marine," in France During 
the German Occupation 1940-1944. Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and 
Peace, trans. by Philip W. Whitcomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 1957), Vol. II, p. 330.
33Potts, Armistice. p. 33.
39Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 15.
LqAdmiral Darlan was Commander-in-Chief of French naval forces at the 
outbreak of the war. He later served Vichy as Minister of Navy, Foreign 
Minister, and Vice Premier. Assassinated in December, 1942 in North Africa 
by an anti-Vichyite.
^Paul Auphan and Jacques Mordal, The French Navy in World War II. 
trans. by Capt. A.C.J. Sabalot (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 
1959), P. 143. Hereafter cited as Auphan , French Navy.
hoHytier, F jF.P.. p. 37.
12
43delivered intact." Qn:24 June Darlan sent another message to naval
units instructing that
Secret precautions for scuttling must be taken in case 
the enemy or the ex-ally tries to take over a ship and use 
it...In no case must they be left intact for the enemy.
Accompanying this message was a secret order to the fleet demonstrating
DarIan's complete mistrust of the British: "Disembark immediately all
British liason officers and personnel.. .Watch out for possible British
45attacks." When it became obvious that an armistice was going to be
46signed Darlan ordered all French ships to leave British ports.
Petain, previously having decided that France was free from her ob­
ligations to the British concerning the signing of an armistice with Ger­
many, still recognized the commitment that the fleet would never fall into 
47eneiry hands. In a statement to the British government on 23 June, For­
eign Minister Baudouin attempted to assure it that the French government's
dominating concern has been to lend itself to no measure 
which might make of France or any element of French ac- ^  
tivity an instrument turned directly against Great Britain.
The Vichy government was, then, somewhat aware of the importance of its
fleet to itself, to Germany, and to Great Bid tain. In this last case,
however, the French seriously underestimated the importance placed on the
fleet by the British. This miscalculation was shortly to lead to one of
the sorrier episodes of the war.
^Shirer, Collapse, p. 855.
^Ibid.. p. 889.
4?Ibid.. p. 37.
^Ibid.. p. 44.
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The emergence of the Petain government and the signing of the Arm­
istice were shocking setbacks to British war plans. The possible loss 
of the French fleet to the Axis was the most discouraging and dangerous 
aspect of the disastrous development. Churchill in a speech to Commons 
had declared that ''the safety of Great Britain and the British Empire is.
powerfully, if not decisively, affected by what happens to the French 
49fleet." On 25 June, in a speech on the signing of the Armistice,
Churchill displayed his and Great Britain’s pessimism regarding Article
VIII and the attendant German promise not to use the French fleet:
...it is clear that the French war vessels pass into G 
German and Italian control while fully armed.. We note, 
of course, the solemn declaration of the German Govern­
ment that they have no intention of using them for their 
own purposes during the war,„ What is the value of that?
Ask half a dozen countries.
The British objectives concerning the fleet, considered a potential 
menace to the colonial lifeline, were to keep as much of it as possible 
engaged in the war against the Axis, or if this proved impossible, to 
destroy it to prevent the Axis from gaining real control over it. Wit­
ness to this. latter intention is found in a telegram from Sir Dudley 
Pound, First Sea Lord of the British Fleet, to Admiral Sir Andrew Cun­
ningham, Commander-in-Chief of British naval operations in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, dated 17 June stating that "...if France made a separate 
peace every endeavor would be made to obtain control of the French fleet 
beforehand or failing that to have it sunk. That this contingency was
^%reat Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 
5th Ser., Vol. 362 (June 18-July 11, 1940), p. 302. Hereafter cited as 
Gt. Bt., Pari. Deb.
^Shirer, Collapse, p. 889.
51Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 42.
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considered seriously by the British was proven less than three weeks later 
when the British fleet attempted to implement the more drastic alternative 
of Pound's telegram.
On 3 July, 19^0 a British naval force attacked the French fleet har­
bored at Mers-el-Kebir, the military port of Oran, causing severe damage 
to the unprepared French contingent. This action was part of a British 
operation, code named "Catapult," designed to seize, neutralize, or des­
troy the French fleet., Two parts of the plan were carried off with a
degree of success: the seizure of French vessels in British ports and
52the internment and disarming of the French fleet at Alexandria., The 
attack at Mers-el-Kebir and the repurcussions thereof became the focal 
point of the breakdown of Franco-British relations in the summer of 19^0 . 
It also served to alter, to the benefit of France, Germany’s policy toward 
the French fleet and empire.
The question of the disposition of the French fleet was behind Bri­
tain’s hostile action. Churchill was obsessed with this problem, which
53he considered as a life and death matter to his war plans. That he was 
fully prepared to take extreme action against the French fleet is obvious 
upon examination of the ultimatum the commander of the British attack force 
assigned to carry out operation "Catapult" at Oran, Vice Admiral Somerville, 
delivered to his French counterpart at Mers-el-Kebir, Admiral Gensoul. The 
options dictated were to l)join the British fleet and continue fighting 
against Germany and Italy, 2)sail under British control to British ports
^Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 236.
^Robert 0. Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy (Princeton: Prince­
ton University Press, 1966), p.36, Hereafter cited as Paxton, Parades.
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to be interned, or 3)sail under British control to remote French ports in 
the West Indies, for example Martinique, and be demobilized.^ If these 
offers were refused, the French commander was to order the scuttling of 
his fleet or be fired on by the British. This latter contingency was 
provided for in an Admiralty message to-Somerville dated 1 July: "Firm 
intention of H.M.G. that if the French will not accept any of your alter- 
natives they are to be destroyed."-^ Admiral Gensoul's refusal to agree
<6to any of the terras caused the British fleet to implement this directive.
The outward British objective of operation ’’Catapult" was to prevent
the French fleet from falling under Axis control. But, according to
Churchill,' a more profound objective was also sought and satisfied. The
act was designed to prove that the "British War Cabinet feared nothing
67and would stop at nothing" to prosecute its war aims. In view of Bri­
tain's strategic objectives, however, the attack at Mers-el-Kebir did 
little to insure the incapacity of the French fleet., Although a good 
deal of damage was done to the French ships it was incomplete and many
capital and support vessels were left intact or damaged to a degree slight
58enough to permit them to keep functioning. The significant change in
^Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 235.
55Ibid.. p. 23^.
56Ibid.. p. 236.
57Ibid.; p. 238.
68 '■^The French fleet at Oran consisted of two new Battleships, Dunkerque
and Strasbourg, two old battleships, Provence and Bretagne, one carrier, 
Commandant Teste, six flotilla leaders, and several destroyers and subma­
rines. Bretagne was destroyed, Dunkerque run aground and Provence beached.- 
Strasbourg escaped unharmed and the other ships either escaped or sustained 
only slight damage. Capt. S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea. Vol. I: The Def­
ensive (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 195*0» PP. 2if0-2i+5.
16
the French Navy brought about by the attack was an increase in anti-Bri-
59tish wentiment among the senior officers, especially Darlan.
The damage done to the French fleet was negligible compared with the 
damage done to Franco-British relations. The initial reaction at Vichy 
was a "spasm of anger, humiliation, and h a t r e d . T h e  attack was viewed 
as a "hostile initiative" which seriously endangered the maintenance of 
relations with Breat Britain.^ Confusion reigned over the crisis since 
the government had just arrived to make Vichy its "permanent" seat and 
had not yet sorted itself out. Misrepresentation of the British ultimatum 
at Mers-el-Kebir had been transmitted by Admiral Gensoul, in that he had 
failed to communicate the "Martinique alternative." Although this al­
ternative probably would not have been accepted by Vichy, its omission 
from Gensoul1s report made the whole affair appear more calculated and 
brutal. Although armed xri.th inadequate information, the Vichy givernment 
now had to make a decision that would dictate the nature of her approach 
to relations with Great Britain. The alternatives were either to retaliate 
to or ignore the act of hostility. The former would probably entail a 
forced military alliance with the Axis while the latter would eliminate 
all hope of fostering good relations with France!s conqueror. Character­
istically, the .’Men of Vichy" embarked on a policy of "indecision and
^Dorothy Shipley White, Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle. Free France, 
and the Allies (Syracuse, N. Y,: Syracuse University Press, 196*0, p. 85. 
Hereafter cited as White,' Seeds.
^Paxton, Parades.' p. 37.
, 61Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 61.
62Ibid.. pp. 55-56.
half measures" which was to mark their future policies.
Indecision was not, however, one of Admiral Darlan's failings. An
Anglophobe since the pre-war naval conferences, Darlan, "a strange mixture
of cold calculation and unreasoning passion," desired revenge on Britain
64regardless of the consequences. After agitating for a series of attacks 
against the British fleet in a Council of Ministers meeting on 4 July, Dar­
lan, moderated by the pleas of the Foreign Minister, settled for symbolic
65air raids against Gibraltar. On 5 July a series of ineffectual bombing 
raids was made against Gibraltar, satisfying Darlan's cravings for revenge 
while preventing the immediate outbreak of hostilities with Great Britain.^ 
Foreign Minister Baudouin was not as resolute as Darlan. Seeking the 
middle road, he suggested severing official relations with Great Britain. 
This was done ostensibly to placate Darlan and eliminate the possibility 
of provoking hostilities with Britain. Primarily, though, Baudouin's 
action came in response to his interpretation of the sentiments of Petain, 
who wished to find some way of expressing the displeasure of the Vichy gov­
ernment without precipitating a resumption of hostilities. Petain agreed
to the breaking off of diplomatic relations, noting that such'.a situation
68had existed de facto since the departure of Campbell in late June.
^Hytier, F. F. P. p. 61.
64Ibid.
^%obert Aron, The Vichy Regime 1940-19^. tran. by Humphrey Hare 
(New York: Mac Millan Co., 1958), p.,81, Hereafter cited as Aron, Vichy.
^Paxton, Parades. p. 72.
6*7'Farmer, Political Dilemma, p. 185.
^Aron, Vichy Regime, p. 80.
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/ 69Petain attributed the situation to Churchill’s "personal lack of balance."
On 5 July official diplomatic relations between Vichy and London were ter­
minated.^
Franco-German relations were also affected by the British attack. To 
Hitler the attack was an evidential vindication of hia policy toward the 
French fleet. Count Ciano the Italian Foreign Minister echoed this sent­
iment and stated, on 8 July in a conversation with Hitler, that it was for­
tunate that he (Hitler) had not taken a harder line in regard to the French
fleet and that "by this intelligent handling of the fleet question, England
71and France had been made mutual enemies." At the same time Ciano, and
probably Hitler as well, recognized that the British were not yet beaten.
Ciano stated that the incident
proves that the fighting spirit of His British Majesty's 
fleet is quite alive, and still has the aggressive ruth^? 
lessness of the captains and pirates of the 17 century.
As for concrete results, the French navy secured a greater latitude 
of action as a result of the German interpretations of the situation. Hit­
ler was still unwilling to make any changes outside the terms of the Arm­
istice, but the changes that took place within those confines were signi­
ficant. In response to the demands of General Huntziger for extensive mod­
ifications of the terms of Article VIII, the Armistice Commission made some
^P^tain to Bullitt, 4 July, 1940 in Hull, Memoirs, p. 799.
^Churchill. Finest Hour, p. 238.
71' U.S.Dept, of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, series D 
(1937-1945)» Vol. X, p. 148. Hereafter cited as U.S. Dept, of State, D.G.F.P.
^Ciano, Diaries, p. 237.
concessions. Having notified Huntziger that Hitler approved the military 
measures already taken hy France, the Commission temporarily suspended 
Article VIII, until the "situation was clarified.'1 By the terms this sus­
pension, the French navy was given considerable reign in a "zone of action"
73centered around Moroccan and North African naval areas. This represented 
a significant softening of the terms of Article VIII and a real, if somewhat
pyhrric victory for Vichy. The freedom allowed the French fleet was to be­
come an important determining factor in the relations of Vichy with both 
Germany and Great Britain throughout the summer and autumn of 19^0.
After signing the Armistice with the Axis powers, France's foreign 
policy was dominated by attempts to solve the internal problems created by 
losing a major war and the problem of maintaining their fleet and Empire.
The goal of the first policy task was to rebuild physically and morally. 
Solutions to these problems could be arrived at only through negotiations 
with the Germans. The aim of the second policy area was to protect the 
fleet and Empire from both the Axis and the British.
Given the realities of the situation of France in the summer of 19^0*
it becomes apparent that if the leaders of Vichy France, and especially 
Marshal Petain, wished to solve these problems, they would have to carry 
on simultaneous relations with Germany and Great Britain in each of their 
respective spheres of greatest influence. These policy areas naturally 
overlapped and had reciprocal influences.
^Potts, Armistice, pp. 35-38.
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The problems regarding the French fleet were the roost immediate and 
the reactions of the French leaders to them were indicative of their approach 
to the overlapping policy they had to undertake. A pattern was established 
that was to become increasingly obvious throughout the period under consid­
eration. This pattern consisted of making and keeping promises to both Ger­
many and Britain as long as those obligations did not encroach on the sov­
ereignty of the French fleet and Empire. In spite of the ostensible con­
tradictions and inconsistencies, French policy remained, to a great degree 
constant.
CHAPTER II
FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS: 10 JULY-28 OCTOBER 19*4-0
By the first of July, the Third Republic had become, in certain 
influential political circles, a hated and disreputable institution.
The problems faced by the newly formed government of Marshal Petain, * 
and especially that of "moral regeneration" were thought to be impos­
sible to solve through the methods of democracy.^ A strong anti-rep-
2ublican movement arose, led by Pierre Laval who insisted on abolishing
3Parlement and giving "exceptional constitutional powers" to the Marshal. 
In so doing Laval hoped to establish a government more acceptable to 
the conquerors of France. Petain, averse to a course of such radical, 
definitive action, wished merely to send Parlement on an extended vac­
ation and rule ty decree in its temporary absence. Finally, on 10 July, 
after a series of extremely complicated political maneuvers, Laval
^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. ?2.
2Pierre Laval first entered the French government in 191*4- as a soc­
ialist. He entered the Senate in 192? and began moving to the political 
right. He became Premier in 1931-2 and again in 1935-6. After the fall 
of France in June and the "National Revolution" in July he became Vice- 
Premier in the Vichy government. He became foreign Minister in October, 
19A0 but was removed from this post and placed -under arrest in December, 
19*4-0. In 19*4-2, in response to German pressure, he once again was named 
Vice-Premier. He retained this position until the liberation. He was 
tried and convicted on charges of collaboration and executed.
^Shirer, Collaose. p. 904.
4Ibid.
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<Laval triumphed. Sitting in joint session, the Deputies and Senators 
voted, 569-80, to abolish the Republic and grant full constitutional 
powers to Petain.^ The repercussions of this Republican suicide were 
to be dramatically manifested in the changing foreign policy of the new- 
authoritarian Vichy government.
Pierre Laval, the architect of the decision, was rewarded with the
designation as Pdtain1s immediate successor. Prom this powerful position
Laval assumed the responsibility of conducting relations with the Third
Reich, excluding from this sphere Foreign Minister Baudouin. In effect,
from 10 July until 28 October, when Laval was officially installed as
foreign minister, the foreign relations were directed, often in mutual
ignorance and extreme secrecy, by two foreign ministers, Baudouin with
7Great Britain and the neutrals, and Laval with Germany. This situation, 
along with Pdtain's lack of political sophistication, gave French for­
eign policy its suspicious, often contradictory, and dualistic character.
Baudouin and a small clique around Petain tried to formulate some 
policy toward Great Britain after Mers-el-Kebir. At this time, however, 
the problems of relations and negotiations with the Germans occupied most 
of the time and attentions of the Vichy government. Baudouin, excluded 
from this policy area by Laval’s usurpation, made only a very few efforts 
to mend relations with London. Wishing to maintain some unofficial con­
tacts, he-wanted to leave the French commercial mission and consul gen­
eral in London, and his suggestions on this were accepted by the British
^For a full account see Shirer, Collapse, pp. 903-9^6.
^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 7Q
7Ibid.
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until they learned, of the conditions Baudouin wished to place on the move. 
They were: 1)restitution of French warships in Alexandria and England with 
their crews, 2)reciprocal restitution of French and British merchantmen, 
3)payment of an indemnity for the ships damaged or destroyed at Mers-el- 
Kebir and Dakar (which had also been attacked as part of operation "Cat­
apult") and compensation-for the victims* families, 4)lifting of the Mart­
inique blockade, and 5) a British promise to let French ships sail where 
8they wished. Baudouin strongly suspected these conditions would be re­
fused by the British and indeed they were. This feeble attempt at re­
establishing relations failed and the diplomatic deadlock continued for 
several months.
In the other policy area, the agents of Vichy were more active, al­
though little more successful. The most immediate problems resulted from 
the German occupation. Negotiations at Wiesbaden proceeded at almost a 
negative pace and the attitudes of the German representatives were not 
conducive to fruitful negotiation. Georges Scapini, the chief of the 
French mission for prisoners of war, stated that his task, the emancipa­
tion of the P.O.W. *s, or at least the amelioration of the conditions of
9captivity, was viewed by German officials as:a"begging mission."
Another example of Germany’s intransigence was its reaction to French 
insistence that the government be allowed to return to Paris, as provided
8Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 70.
^Georges Scapini, "Prisoners" in France During the C-erman Occupation. 
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace (Stanford: Stanford Univ­
ersity Press, 1957). Vol. I, pp. 203-2C&.
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for by Article III of the Armistice. According to the agreement the Ger­
mans pledged to
. ...grant all the necessary facilities to the French 
Government and its central administration authorities 
so that it may be able to administ^g the occupied and 
unoccupied territories from Paris.
■The German position on this matter, as an example of its attitudes to­
ward negotiations with Vichy, is well illustrated by a telegram from
11Ribbentrop to Gtto Abetz, his unofficial ambassador in Paris, on 16
August, directing him to:
Please continue to treat the question of the transfer 
of the French Government of individual ministries in a 
dilatory way,. Such a transfer is out of the question 
at this time.
Further examples of the tone of the relations between Germany and Vichy 
are equally illuminating.
The economic problems of the occupied zone were intensified in early 
summer by the German closure of the demarcation line. This action effect­
ively stopped North-South commercial traffic and paralyzed the economies 
of both zones. The unoccupied zone needed the wheat, potatoes, sugar, m 
meat, coal, steel, and manufactured goods from the Northern (occupied) 
zone, which, in turn, needed the vegetables, fruits, wine, aluminum,
10Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 120.
11Otto Abetz was the representative of the German Foreign Ministry 
with the German Military Commander in France. He was given the rank 
of Ambassador in August, 19̂ -0.
12u .s . Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy.
Series D (1937-19^5) (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1957), Vol. X, p. 491. Hereafter cited as U.S. Dept, of State. D.G.F.P.
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and various colonial products from the Southern (unoccupied) zone. In
the grasp of such an economic stranglehold, the Vichy government had to
make many concessions, such as allowing the Germans to appoint customs
and trade inspectors. Going further, Vichy promised to
...orient France’s foreign trade in a way most apt to 
increase the economic potential of the country and for­
bid the export of products liable to be transferred to 
a power at war with the Reich.
Interminable economic negotiations ensued, the main points of which sig­
nified not only Germany’s economic demands on France but its general at­
titudes toward its vassal.
Germany’s attitudes on relations with France were well illustrated 
by the economic demands made by the occupation forces. The economic ad­
ministration was under the control of the Wirtschaftsabteilung. the econ- 
onim branch of the Verwaltungsstab. the non-military organization of the 
staff of the Militarbefehlshaber in France, the supreme head of the Ger­
man occupation forces. The Wehrwirtshaftsstab. whose task it was to con­
trol the French war industries, was the most important agency of economic 
14-administration. Through these agencies Germany made exorbitant demands 
on all of French economy. France was, for example, obliged to finance 
the German imports of French products, and a great imbalance between 
French exports and imports ensued. This enormous flow of goods from 
France was made even more beneficial to Germany ty the establishment of 
a 20:1 exchange rate for the Franc to the Reichmark. Not only were French
l3Hytier, F.F.P.. pp. 121-122. 
^Ibid.. -pp. 108-111.
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goods pouring into Germany,' they were ridiculously and artificially cheap.15
Occupation costs, such as billeting German troops, were outrageously
exorbitant. France was obliged to pay R.M. twenty million per day, or
JfOO million Francs, an amount sufficient, according to General Huntziger,
to pay for the upkeep of eighteen million French troops and officers. The
only way France would be able to meet these demands would be to print more
16money, still further escalating the artificial devaluation. The French
government had no recourse, when forced with these economic faits accomplis
and demands, but to pay. Many protests were, of course, made but these
gained just a little time. It was obvious that Germany had little desire
1?to come to fair economic agreements with vanquished France. The exor­
bitant demands were justified simply on the grounds that it was, at that
time, impossible to establish occupation costs, so the arbitrary figure 
18was set. If France were to prove hesitant to give in to these demands,
19Germany would resort to military measures to force compliance. These 
aspects of the economic demands were but a part of the total scope of 
Germany’s plans for occupation. Territorial demands serve further wit­
ness to their attitudes regarding the treatment of France.
The historical problem of Alsace-Lorraine again came to the fore in 
the summer of 19^0. Following the defeat of France Germany took rapid 
steps to annex and colonize Alsace-Lorraine. The first move was to re­
establish’ the pre-World War I frontiers, physically placing the area in
16Ibid.. p. 123.
1?Ibid.. p. 130.
18U.S. Dept, of State, D.G.F.P.. X, pp. 438-^39.
*%alder, Journal. IV, p. 169.
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in Germany. All French customs officials were replaced by Germans. Ger­
man legal codes replaced French law. The large scale expulsion of "French
20elements," Jews, and Catholics soon followed. The French government
made repeated protests when, which was not often the case, they were in-
21formed of the abuses. Germany’s response was typified by a memo from
the Director of the Economic Policy Department, Wiehl, stating that: "There
is no need on the German side to inform the French officially of the actual
22state of affairs in response to their notes." With the introduction of 
the German language for schools, administrative agencies, courts, contracts, 
and of the German civil administration, Alsace-Lorraine was in effect an­
nexed. 23
At the same time Germany was making demands for military and econ­
omic concessions in North Africa. Specifically desired were fully equipped 
airfields in Casablanca, radio-telegraph and weather stations, control of
the Tunis-Rabat railroad, Mediterranean harbors, both in France and North
2kAfrica, and French freighters and crews to transport German goods. In 
this case, French protests were heeded. Vichy sent the protests to Hitler 
via Wiesbaden. These were apparently heeded because the demands were never 
mentioned again. This episode served to strengthen, at least temporarily,
25the position of those in Vicly favoring a firm stand against German demands.
20Efytier, F.F.P., p.. 126.
21U.S. Dept, of State, D.G.F.P.. X, pp. 4-98-4-99.
22Ibid.
‘ 23Ibid.
2\rar§on, P.M. II, p. 784.
2Vtier, F.F.P.. pp. 132-133.
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The successful calling of the German bluff was again attributable to the
2 6power and leverage provided by the French fleet and empire.
The policy goals of Germany, while at this time still somewhat neb­
ulous, were conditioned by Hitler’s attitudes toward France. As he told
Mussolini, "Naturally it must not be forgotten that France is the nat-
27ural enemy of the Axis." France, as the absolute enemy, was to pay in
many ways.-; for losing the war. In a general sense, Hitler declared that
France "must pay and pay dearly for her responsibility.. .France declared
28war without cause, was beaten and must pay." Weisacker, the State Sec­
retary of the German Foreign Office, claimed that "...Hitler did not want
to spare France; he world have preferred to have done a deal with England
29at the cost of France." Specifically, France was to pay politically and 
economically. Regarding the former, Hitler told Mussolini that France must 
"...never again have a role of primary importance in Europe and must cede
30to Germany and Italy, what is due these Powers."^ Hitler also intended
to meddle in the internal politics of Vichy, as witness his statement:
Our policy at this moment must consist in cleverly 
playing off one,, lot against the other. There must 
be two Frances.
In the economic sphere, German intentions were succinctly stated by
^^Ernst von Weisacker, Memoirs. trans by John Andrews (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1951)* p. 236. Hereafter cited as Weis&cker, Memoirs.
27Halcom Muggeridge, ed...Ciano’s Diplomatic Pacers, trans. by Stuart 
Hood (London: Odham Press, 19^8), p. 396. Hereafter cited as Ciano, Dip.
28Ibid.. p. 401.
2%eisacker, Memoirs, p. 236.
•^Ciano, Dip. Papers, p. 396.
Adolf Hitler, Secret Conversations, trans. by Norman Cameron and 
R.H. Stevens (New York: Farras, Straus, and Young, 1953), p.-217..
29
Goring, as delegate for the Four Year Plan:
It is an ineluctable necessity for domestic policy 
that...the capacity and reserves of raw materials in the 
occupied territories of the West be utilized rationally 
and fully, to heop the Reich’s armament production and 
increase the war potential.
It was obvious from the economic specifics already noted that the un­
fair exchange rates, the ruinous clearing agreement, the ridiculous 
occupation costs, the arbitrary control of the Demarcation Line, and 
the introduction of German commercial and customs inspectors, meant 
that Germany intended to make France pay a grievous price for having 
lost the war.
In the more far-reaching aspects' of Germany’s policy also, France
was to pay. The idea of a "world coalition" against Great Britain was
a constant dream of Hitler’s. The basic plan was to "unite in an anti-
British front all nations willing to join...France is to be induced to
33enter into a disguised alliance..."^ Count Ciano, reflecting on a
meeting between Hitler and Mussolini on 4 October, said:
Fantastic as that may seem, Hitler does not ex­
clude the possibility of having the French forces 
on our side in a Continental coalition against Great 
Britain.
This coalition was to include Italy, Germany, Russia, Spain, Central Eur­
ope, and France. If France were to join the coalition, however, as Hit­
ler stated:
she must clearly understand that... she must resign 
herself to the idea of satisfying the territorial
-^Hytier^ F.F.P.. p. 153. 
•^Haider, Journal.' IV, p. 225. 
•^Ciano, Dip. Papers. p. 396.
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demands of Germany, Italy, and Spain, both in Europe 
and in Tunisia,
This policy was not definite and depended to a great degree on 
France's willingness to participate. The key issue was again the French 
fleet and empire. The territorial cessions of the coalition idea had 
to be handled delicately or, as von Etzdorf, the German foreign office 
representative to the O.K.W. feared, France "will cease defending her
O
colonies and play them into British hands." Hitler, in explaining the
French role in the coalition, reiterated German fears by stating that:
The most pressing task of the French is the defensive 
and offensive protection of their A£t1can possessions, West
W : : and Equatorial, against England...
This "world coalition" plan contained all the basic elements of German 
policy toward France, France was to bear the major burden of the costs, 
economic and territorial, of creating the "New Order." Because of the 
power of its fleet and empire, however, it was to be coerced instead of 
crushed into agreement. It was to this end that all German relations 
with France were directed. The German negotiators were soon to find a 
representative of the Vichy government receptive to their ideas.
With the Wiesbaden negotiations proceeding at a rate too slow to 
deal effectively with the problems created by the occupation, the leaders 
of Vichy sought and discovered another channel. The most ardent advocate 
of negotiations with the Germans outside the confines of Wiesbaden was
^Hitler, Sec. Cony., p. 387,
37U.S. Dept, of State, D.G.F.P.. XI, p. 527.
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Pierre Laval. His attitudes were formed from several basic beliefs. He
was a pacifist and had opposed France’s entry into the war. As he told
his lawyer at his post-war trial, "Nothing justifies war be it offensive
or defensive.. .Tell me sincerely if everything, I mean everything, is not
preferable to war." His second belief was that Germany was destined to
win the war. This belief was shown in his question to the court at the
trial of Petain: "Do you believe that in 19*K) a man of good sense could
39have imagined anything but the victory of Germany?" His third belief
took the form of an abiding fear that, unless many concessions were made
to Germany, Great Britain and the Reich would conclude a compromise agree-
U-0xnent without consulting and to the more extreme detriment of France.
WHis final belief was that Hitler did not x-dsh to crush France. It was 
upon this belief that most of Laval’s efforts were based. He had to make 
Hitler realize that "Germany was incapable of reconstructing Europe with- 
out the active help of France." He further sought to make France ac­
cept its role as a building block for the "New Order" and thus avoid the
hrxdrastic circumstances of refusal to work with Hitler. The only -way 
Laval saw to achieve this end of becoming an integral part of the "New 
Order," was to work with, or as it was soon to be called, collaborate,with
38Hytier, F.F.P..:p.l47.
39Gar?on, P̂ M*., I. P. 539.
^°U .S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 
19*1-0 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957) t Vol. II, p. 330. 
Hereafter cited as U.S. Dept, of State, F.R.U.S..
. 41 Ibid.. p. 378.
2|_2Garcon, P.M.. I. p. f&O.
43Ibid.. pp. 539-5^0.
Ijifwith the Germans.
Laval was not alone in these beliefs. There was a growing feeling
among the more "realistically minded" at Vichy that Laval's course was
the right one to follow. The "anti-collaboration"group, headed by
"nothing but the Armistice" Weygand, however, had the largest portion of
45 ,the Marshal's ear. Petain did not, however, shut; ;off Laval's alley.
In early July Laval summoned to Vichy Fernand de Brinon, a germanophile 
journalist and a personal friend of Ribbentrop, and the first Vichy French­
man to have a personal interview with Hitler. He was requested by Laval,
with the knowledge and approval of Petain, to go to Paris and establish
46contacts with the Germans. De Brinon was personally charged by Laval
to "study all the questions relative to the resumption of relations with
47Germany under ny authority." ' Laval's personal representative first
48sought out an old friend, Otto Abetz, the unofficial representative of 
the German Foreign Office in Paris. While not overly optimistic about the 
possible results Abetz told de Brinon to have Laval continue his attempts 
in this area.
Laval made several trips to Paris during the summer but, as far as 
could be judged from his tight-lipped reports, obtained no concrete re­
sults. In spite of this lack of progress, Laval became more arrogant
^^ytier, F.F.P.. p. 137.
45Ibid., pp. 137-144.
46Gar£on, P^M., II, p. 728.
• ^Ifytier, F.F.P.. p. 135.
^Ibid., pp. 131-136.
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49and disdainful of others' efforts at negotiating with the Germans.
His colleagues, kept from the facts of his visits by his scornful 
secrecy, began suspecting him of trying to play his own game exclu­
sively, above and beyond the knowledge and desires of the Marshal. He 
had to have had at least tacit approval from Petain for, as French dip­
lomat Leon Noel noted: 'Without Petain, Laval could never have launched 
or pursued the policy of collaboration."^ Petain was, nonetheless, 
basically ignorant of the scope of Laval's actions, due to both Laval.*s
51silence and his own love of secrecy.
De Brinon's friend and Laval's German contact in Paris, Otto Abetz,
52was designated, on 3 August, as German ambassador. His functions, as 
outlined by a directive from his sole superior Ribbentrop, x-iere to advise 
the military authorities on questions of a political nature, provide a 
continuous liason with the Vichy government and its representatives in 
the occupied zone, exercise influence in the desired direction on the 
important French political figures, provide political guidance for the 
press, radio, and propaganda and thus influence the formation of public 
opinion in the unoccupied area. He was further to assist Germans, French­
men, and Belgians returning from internment camps, advise the Secret 
Military Police and the Gestapo in the acquisition of important political 
documents, and assist in the siezure of private and public artistic
^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 143.
5°Ibid.. p. 72.
^Acurious designation since traditionally countries at war have 
not exchanged diplomatic agents. He was never accredited to the Vichy 
government, which was never consulted about his appointment, ibid.. p. 114.
52U.S. Dept, of State, D.O.F.P.. X, pp. 407-408.
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53properties. Abetz and Laval had a close personal affinity, based on 
their mutual desire to further Franco-German collaboration.
Although Abetz was a confirmed francophile, he was above all a Ger­
man devoted to furthering German interests and goals. He expanded on 
his stated functions and created a confusing and complicated milieu for 
his relations with Laval. This complexity probably could be seen as man­
ifestations of his desires to insert his personal opinions and intentions 
into policy, and his tendency to overrate his importance and embellish
his accomplishments. Hitler was not overly impressed with him and stated:
54"Abetz is too exclusively keen on collaboration, to my taste." As the 
only German to have regular official relations with representatives of 
Petain's government he was a key figure in Franco-German relations. The 
relations in Paris were to prove more fruitful than those at Wiesbaden, 
though not necessarily beneficial to France.
The main tenets of Germany’s policy toward defeated France were 
now established. The agents for the possible implementation of this 
policy were also available, willing, and in positions of responsibility. 
If left up to Laval and Abetz collaboration would have become the by­
word for Franco-German relations. Other factors did, however, enter 
into the diplomatic picture and these factors served to curtail the 
abilities of Abetz and Laval to promulgate the policy of collaboration.
53Hytier; g J L P J  pp. 134-135. 
^Hitler, Sec. Conv.. p. 280.
CHAPTER III
FRANCO -BRITISH RELATIONS: 10 JUIZ-28 OCTOBER 1940
After the immediate crisis of Mers-el-Kebir had passed with no
serious reprisals Great Britain adopted a "forgive and forget" attitude
toward France.* This attitude lasted only until the end of July when'
London provided new provocation in its continuing dispute with Vichy
France. This took the form of the extension of the economic blockade
2of Germany to include the whole of France and French North Africa. Ex­
plaining this action in Commons Churchill stated: "It is our intention 
to maintain and enforce a strict blockade, not only of Germany, but of
Italy and France and all the other countries that have fallen into German 
3power." The strategy of operation "Catapult" to neutralize the French
fleet was thus a necessary prelude to the extension of the blockade to
prevent supplies from falling into Axis hands through France.
The French reaction to the blockade was not surprising. Baudouin
called it "an act of hostility, worse perhaps than the grievous assassi-
Anation at Mers-el-Kebir." France, always dependent on imports, had only
S/ins ton S. Churchill, Blood. Sweat, and Tears (New York: G.F. Put­
nam’s Sons, 1941), p. 334. Hereafter cited as Churchill, B.S.T.
^Hubert Cole, Laval (New York: G,P.Putnam’s Sons, 1963)» p. H5.
•̂ Great Britain, Pari. Deb.. Vol. 364* p. 1161 
hBytier, F.F.P.. p. 90.
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two options to consider if the blockade were enforced strictly for any 
length of time: to starve, or to force the blockade by the -use of armed 
convoys. If the latter option were put into effect, open hostilities 
with Great Britain would ensue, hostilities for which the French were 
neither prepared nor disposed to undertake.^ The timing of the impo­
sition of the blockade was extremely inopportune for both Great Britain 
and Vichy France. Churchill’s antagonism toward Vichy, at a time when 
conciliation would have been more advantageous, caused Britain to lose 
the chance for a possible amelioration of Franco-British problems and 
edged both countries toward a war that neither wanted. France was being 
pressured by the Axis for more concessions and promises of collaboration 
when the British blockade was announced. The result of these two factors 
was to push Vichy to the verge of war with Britain while, at the same 
time, lessening chances for better relations with the Axis.^
In the late summer of 19^0 another block to Franco-British relations,
the Free French movement headed ty Charles de Gaulle, was developing. In
June the British had agreed to allow de Gaulle to establish a French
7"centre of resistance" in England.’ Soon after this the British govern­
ment recognized de Gaulle as "the leader of all Free Frenchmen, wherever
^Hytier, F.F.F.. p. 88.
^Farmer, Dilemma, p. 190.
^Sir Desmond Morton, "The Free French Movement, l9^0-^2," Survey 
of International Affairs. Vol. VII: Hitler’s Europe, ed. by Arnold and 
Veronica Taynbee (London: Oxford University Press, 195^)> p. ^37. Here­
after cited as Morton, "Movement.”
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8they may be,' who rally to him in support of the Allied Cause." The Brit­
ish motives for supporting de Gaulle were anything but altruistic, for 
they wanted to use him only as a military rallying point for any dissi­
dent members of the French Armed Forces, simply to increase the numbers
9of those fighting for the Allied cause. The recognition of de Gaulle as 
leader of Free France did not constitute recognition of him as the head 
of any legal French government.*^ Recruitment of followers was a dif­
ficult task for de Gaulle, especially after ’lers-el-Kebir. From the 
end of June, 1940 throughout the summer the Free French forces in Eng­
land never numbered more than 6,000 men.** Relations between de Gualle 
and Churchill were not always on friendly terms as is witnessed by
Churchill's reported statement that "the heaviest cross I have to bear
12is the Cross of Lorraine."
The Free French movement was given considerable impetus in August 
with the signing of an agreement between de Gaulle and Churchill setting 
up a modus onerandi for dealing with Free French-British relations. The 
agreement came in response to Free French requests that: Free France was 
not to be used as merely a British foreign legion; Free France was to be 
regarded as an ally to continue the war with her own army; and Free France
Qx-Iorton, "Movement, ” p.. 438.
Îbid., p. 436.
* William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1-947), 
p. 77. Hereafter cited as Langer, Gamble.
**Morton, "Movement," pp. 438-439.
*%isley Huddleston, France: The Tragic Years 1939-1947 (New York: The 
Devin-Adair Co., 1955), p. 57. Hereafter cited as Huddleston, Tragic Years.
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13was to be ruled by the constitution of the Third Republic. The main
points of the Agreement were that: de Gaulle was to raise a French vol­
unteer force to be used against the common enemies and never against 
other Frenchmen; this force was to retain a strictly French character; 
this force was to have prior rights to any captured French arms, with 
the British supplying the difference; this force was to be under the 
command of de Gaulle who, in turn, would agree to accept general direction 
from the British High Command if the need arose; and the British Goverh- 
ment was to meet all costs of the Free French movement. Corrolaries to 
this agreement involved British acceptance, in principle, of de Gaulle's 
plan to set up, in the future, a Council of Defense of French Overseas
Possessions. The agreement also called for economic and security collab-
1*5oration of this Council with the British Empire. The Agreement of 7
August served as the basis for Free French-British relations until the 
formation of the French National Committee in September, 1941. The main 
shortcoming of the agreement,' soon to be made obvious, was that no clearly 
defined restrictions were placed on de Gaulle commensurate with the power 
vested in him.^
The British agreement to aid Free French colonies was soon invoked, 
for a number of colonies of the French empire went over to de Gaulle and
^White, Seeds, p. .141.
14€harles de Gaulle, War Memoirs. Vol. I: The Call to Honor: Docu­
ments (New York: The Viking Press, 1955)» PP. 24-26. Hereafter cited 
as de Gaulle, Call: Doc.
1 rlorton, "Movement," p. 441.
l6Ibid..» PP» 439-441
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17Free France during the late summer of 1940. ' Britain and de Gaulle
agreed on the importance of acquiring French colonial territory from
which the Free French movement could operate. Since French North Africa
was too strong, the main objectives of this acquisition drive were the
colonies of French West and Equatorial Africa. , In addition to being rich
in needed raw materials, these colonies also could provide a communications
18link with Cairo, by air and road, via the Sudan. The policy of the British 
regarding this colonial drive was to exercise economic pressure on Vichy 
colonies and promise naval defense to those that switched loyalty to 
de Gaulle, At that time the British government limited assistance to 
that of a strictly "moral” nature to avoid provoking Vichy more than was
19necessary.
By late August, however, Vichy was provoked. The defection of French 
colonies and the verbal attacks made on Petain by de Gaulle served to raise 
to new levels the anti-British sentiment at Vichy.^0 The loss of colonies 
was especially distasteful to Laval, not because of any sense of pride in 
the Empire,' but because they had been a valuable bargaining point with 
Germany. Laval considered the colonies "...a means of pressure, an
17'The colonies that went over to de Gaulle were the New Hebrides,
Chad,' Cameroons, Middle Congo, Ubangi Shari, Tahiti, French India, and 
New Caledonia. Ibid.. p. 443.
 ̂̂Morion,’ "Movement," pp. 441-444.
1<5'Alfred Cobban, "Vichy France," Survey of International Affairs. Vol. 
Hitler’s Europe, ed. by Arnold'and Veronical Toynbee (London: Oxford Univ­
ersity Press, 1954), p. 359. Hereafter cited as Cobban, “Vichy."
* 20Aron, Vichy Regime, p.206.
21instrument. As long as they are there, I can talk to the Germans.1
Laval considered the disappearance of this lever as serious enough to
22propose declaring war on Great Britain. Wishing to avoid any extreme 
measures, however, Petain blocked this proposal. At this time Petain also 
began exerting somewhat more direct influence on the government and for­
eign policy of Vichy. By trying to legislate away Laval's powers as
"dauphin", Petain prompted a regeneration of the power struggle with 
23Laval, The combination of the blockade by Great Britain, the siezure
of French colonies by Free French forces, and the Petain-Laval political
conflict created a dangerous atmosphere in September, 19^0. Vichy and
24London were again on the brink of a war that neither wanted.
The ingredients were present and they were soon stirred into a major
crisis. The logical site was Dakar, the administrative capital of French
West Africa^ located on the extreme western tip of the African bulge only
1700 miles from South America. Blessed with an excellent harbor capable
of handling any war fleet, this "Atlantic Gibraltar" dominated the trade
25routes between the Far East, India, and Europe. ^ There were many rumors 
of proposed German plans to establish a submarine base at Dakar to
Ai
Geoffrey Warner, Pierre Laval and the Scliose of France (New York: 
The MacMillan Company, 1968), p. 223. Hereafter cited as Warner, Laval.
^General G. Schmitt, Les Accords Sdbr&ts Franco-3ritannique de 
Novembre-Decembre 1940: Mstoire ou mystification. (Paris: Presses Univ- 
ersitaires de France, 1957)* P. 37. Hereafter cited as Schmitt, Accords.
^Aron, Vichy Regime, pp. 207-208.
2^Bjytier, F.F.P.. p. 90.
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2 6interdict British trade via the Cape route. That Churchill recognized
this danger is witnessed by his letter to South African Prime Minister
General Jan Christian Smuts of 9 September, 1940 in which he stated " If
Dakar fell under German control and became a U-boat base, the consequences
27to the Cape route would be deadly." Churchill, in addition to desiring
to prevent Dakar from falling into German hands, wished to wrest it from
Vichy control to protect Gaullist colonies and use it as a future base
28of operations for the recapture of metropolitan France. These stra­
tegic needs closely coincided with those of de Gaulle, who wanted Dakar 
as his colonial captial and as a springboard for future operations against 
Vichy.2$ ¥ith such agreement on the need for the acquistition of Dakar, 
it was only a question of time until an arrangement for operations against 
it would be arrived at between de Gaulle and Churchill.
The controversy over who first suggested the plan for the Dakar ex­
pedition is not really relevant. It appears, however, that the idea was
30germinated in de Gaulle's staff and was then trasmitted to Churchill. 
Discussions between de Gaulle and Churchill were begun in July, 1940 and 
by August rough plans for the expedition had been adopted. In a directive
^danger, Gamble, p. 82.
^Churchill, Their Finest Hour.~ p. 487.
28White,' Seeds. P. i?8.
2^Auphan/ French Navy7 p. 183.
•^In a letter to Dorothy White Gen. Sir Edward Spears, Military liason 
officer to the Free French stated that the idea of the mission "evolved in 
discussions between my mission and de Gaulle's staff and was put up to 
Churchill through the Chiefs of Staff Committee" White, Seeds, p. 409.
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to Lt. General Sir Hastings Lionel Ismay, the Chief of Staff to the Min­
ister of Defense,Churchill states on 8 August that, in view of the danger 
of the spreading of German influence in that area with the aid of Vichy,
"it would seem extremely important to British interests that General de
31Gaulle should take Dakar at the earliest moment.""^ Churchill stressed
the French character of and responsibility for the expedition and expressed
his intention to allow de Gaulle to assume full administrative command of
32Dakar after the expedition had been successfully completed.
Operation "Menace," as the expedition was code named, was to carry 
out the siezure of Dakar in three stages. The way was to be prepared 
by the propaganda activities of Gaullists in Dakar. Then, when the attack 
force arrived, an open landing was to be made under a flag of truce. De
Gaulle would then issue an ultimatum to the Vichy governor demanding cap-
33 34itulation of the city. The Governor, Pierre Boisson, seeing the British
fleet on the horizon, would hand his post over to de Gaulle. The operation
35was to be completed by nightfall of the first day of encounter. De Gaulle 
and Churchill were optimistic about the chances of success, the latter so 
much so that he declared the Dakar expedition "was a pup." The risks 
of antagonizing Vichy to the point of war were minimized by Churchill who
^Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 475.
32Ibid.. p. 476.
33Auphan, French Navy, p. 188.
^Pierre Boisson was a career colonial service official. He was the 
High Commissioner of French Black Africa. He'was described as "an intel­
ligent, energetic man, as anti-German as could be found."
33Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 4?9.
36Ibid.. p.477.
37"felt in irry fingertips that Vichy France would not declare war." He 
based his decision to proceed with the operation on more than a gut feel­
ing, however, and his logic was clear in his statement that "if Vichy did 
not declare war after Oran, or under the pressure of our blockade, there 
is no reason why they should do so if there is a fight at Dakar. 1 After
several delays, therefore, task force "M" departed Liverpool under the com-
39mand of Vice-Admiral John Cunningham.
Although he had learned on 11 September that a sizeable French squad­
ron had slipped past Gibraltar, Churchill, after communicating with Cun-
40ningham and de Gaulle, decided to let the mission continue. The French
squadron arrived at Dakar on 14 September, greatly adding to the defense
of the city and increasing the chance of defeat for the Anglo-Free French 
i}larmada. On 18 September Churchill gave the operation commanders auth­
ority to decide to continue or abandon the mission. It was his instinct
ho"to let things rip." De Gaulle was also eager to carry out the operation.
•^Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 477.
38Ibid.
■•̂ The British fleet that sailed on 3* August consisted of two battle­
ships, Resolution and Barham, four cruisers, Devonshire, Australia, Cum­
berland, and Oregon, one carrier, Ark Royal, several destroyers, one 
tanker, and three transports. 'White, Seeds. p. 182.
^Churchill, Finest Hour, pp. 483-484.
41The defenses of Dakar included coastal batteries consisting of nine 
240mm, three 155mm, and eight 380mm guns of the crippled battleship, Rich­
elieu; naval forces consisting of two cruisers, two super destroyers, one 
1800 ion destroyer, six armed sloops, two submarines, ten naval attack 
planes, one.fighter group, one bomber group, and five regiments of troops. 
Auphan, French Navy, p. 190.
Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 486.
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On the morning of 23 September force "M" approached Dakar through 
a heavy fog and began initiating operation "Menace." After the open land­
ing phase of the operation failed and a tactless ultimatum was delivered 
to Governor Boisson, the French coastal batteries opened up on the Bri­
tish fleet. An indecisive gunnery duel followed, ensued by an unsuccess­
ful landing attempt by de Gaulle at Rufisque, some distance to the north. 
Inconclusive fighting took place during the following two days until Ad­
miral Cunningham withdrew because of damage caused to several of his ships 
On 25 September Churchill sent a telegram to his commanders suggesting 
breaking off the engagement. They concurred and the battle of Dakar was
M lended.
The reasons for the failure of operation "Menace" were numerous.
First, of course, was the arrival of the French squadron to bolster the 
defenses of Dakar. The failure of the British to stop this force at Gib­
raltar was attributed to a communications breakdown in the British Admi­
ralty. The British commander at Gibraltar, Admiral Sir Dudley North, had 
not been informed of the Dakar mission so his message to the Admiralty 
informing of the prospected passage of French ships was not marked "Im­
portant "and was not deciphered for four days, on 14 September, three days 
after the fact was known through other channels. By the time the import 
of the message had been discovered and the Gibraltar fleet had raised steam
to pursue-the French it was too late. Churchill said "this chapter of
45accidents sealed the fate of the Franco-British expedition to Dakar.
^Auphan, French Navy, pp. 189-191.
44 , .Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 491.
^^Ibid.. p. 492.
45
Due to misinformation and unguarded optimism, the British had under­
estimated both the strength and determination of the Vichy forces at Dakar 
to resist. The fact that a majority- of the coastal artillery was manned 
by French marines who had been at Mers-el-Kebir suggests the determination 
of the defenders of Dakar to resist the British assault. The military 
garrison at Dakar, nearly twice as large as de Gaulle's intelligence re­
ports had indicated was content to obey the orders of the existing Vichy
24.5commanders and showed little desire to embrace de Gaulle. Most impor­
tant, however, was the attitude of Boisson. He was loyal only to the 
French empire and his beloved colonial service and could see no reason to
hand over his responsibility to de Gaulle. He concluded that if he did,
47Germany would have sufficient reason to intervene in Africa. His deter­
mination to resist was exemplified by his answer to de Gaulle's ultimatum
to surrender: "France has entrusted me with Dakar. I will defend Dakar 
48to the end." Churchill recognized these facts in his later statement 
that the "arrival of reinforcements, good gunners and bitterminded Vichy 
officials" ruined the whole scheme of a "bloodless landing and occupation 
by General de Gaulle. When it had become "obvious that Dakar would be 
defended to the death," Churchill decided to push no more. He desired to 
forget the incident and conceded the victoiy to Vichy. ^
Morton, "Movement," p. 4^9.
^White, Seeds, p. 197.
48Auphan, French Navy, p. 190.
^Churchill, Finest Hour, p. 482.
5°Ibid.. pp. 490-493.
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The reaction to ;the Dakar raid on Vichy was immediate. In a meeting
of the "couseil restreint,? Darlan, described as being ‘’demented with rage,"
demanded retaliation. Again he settled for a retaliatory bombing raid on 
51Gibraltar. In a symbolic gesture to justify the symbolic air raid Bau­
douin declared that France was “not so broken that she must endure this
52from her former ally." But the episode was not completely over.
From Dakar de Gaulle moved his small force south to Duala in the Cam-
53eroons where he was significantly more well received. He shortly made 
his way to Brazzaville in the Middle Congo where he set up a temporary 
base of operations. French Equatorial Africa was secured for Free France.
It was from Brazzaville that de Gaulle issued his declaration which offi-
54cially completed his break with the Vichy government. Gn 27 October he
established the "Council for the Defense of the Empire" to "assume the
55burden of directing the French war effort." ^ De Gaulle also issued bit­
ter denunciations of the Vichy regime and of Petain in which he "released"
56all Frenchmen from their obligations to the "pseudo-government of Vichy." 
These declarations, along with the incident at Dakar, were to exercise 
immediate effects on Franco-British relations, the results of which were, 
in the period under consideration, decisive.
By considering the Dakar raid and the issuance of the Brazzaville
^Cole, Laval, p. 124.
•̂ Hew York Times. 24 September, 1940.
^^White. Seeds.’ p. 191. 
t *^De Gaulle, Call: Doc., pp. 46-48.
•^Morton, "Movement," p. 445.
56De Gaulle, Call: Doc.. p. 59.
Declaration as components of one episode, this episode can then be termed 
the turning point in Franco-British relations of 1$40. The failure of Op­
eration "Menace” and the sudden realization of de Gaulle's political ambi­
tions caused London to reassess its stand toward Vichy. By nearly precip­
itating war with Vichy, the Dakar affair caused a psychological depression
67in Britain and alarm in the Commonwealth. De Gaulle’s Manifesto issued 
without the prior knowledge or consent of London, created troublesome pol­
itical questions and reactions. Since de Gaulle was viewed by Churchill 
only as a military' rallying point, his new quest for political power ex­
ceeded Britain’s degree of intention to support him. The British govern­
ment, therefore, made it explicit that de Gaulle was to refrain from such 
political activities if he wished to be guaranteed support. London declared
that it didi.not recognize de Gaulle as the government of France and would
58refuse to condone his views on that subject as stated in his Manifesto.
The affair was.not without its bright sides from the British point
of view. The spread of Vichy-German influence in Africa had been curtailed,
not by the Dakar incident itself but by the secession of the other French
colonies to de Gaulle. The solidification of a Gaullist colonial bloc in
French West and Equatorial Africa permitted the establishment of an open
59air route to the Middle East from the supply lines in West Africa. And 
it changed the British attitude toward Vichy, which by its independent 
defensive stand at Dakar showed that it was far from committed to any
^Cole, Laval, p. 124.
^Morton, "Movement,: pp. 4̂ 6-44-7.
^%hite, Seeds, p. 200.
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kind of collaborative partnership with the Axis powers, at least in the 
military sense
The positive results of the affair were much greater and more clearly 
defined in Vichy. Although Dakar was used, as was the attack at Mer-el- 
Kebir, as an item of anti-British and pro-German collaborationist propa­
ganda, the incident actually increased Vichy's independence from Germany. 
The stubborn defense of Dakar had demonstrated once again to the Germans 
Vichy's willingness and ability to defend its Empire from any aggression. 
The German Armistice commission permitted reinforcement of France's colon­
ial army and a revival of the French Air Force.^ Yves Bouthillier, Vichy 
Finance Minister, claimed that "little by little after September the French 
government felt the grip of the Germans slacken." New attempts at and 
avenues of Franco-German negotiations were being established at this time 
further easing the pressure on occupied France.
In regard to relations with Great Britain, the manifestations were 
less concrete but no less real. British respect for Vichy was greatly in­
creased by the defense of Dakar, as was the morale of the French military.
In this sense, the battle contributed greatly to the temporary detente
64that was soon to be established. New hope of resistance was given the
^Farmer, Dilemma, p. 193.
^Hytier, F.F.P.. pp. 86-87.
^White, Seeds. p. 198.
^Paxton, Parades and Politics, p. 84.
‘ ^Jacques Mordal, "La Bataille navale de Dakar," Revue des Deux Monies; 
m i l  (Sept. 15, 1955), pp. 321-323.
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6 5petainist faction of the government. Appearances are often as influential 
as realities, and Vichy at least thought they they had gained British re­
spect, a respect that was to be temporarily manifested in marked improve­
ments in their mutual relations.^ While the initial reaction in Vichy 
to Dakar had been "a new surge of hostility toward the British," the ep­
isode "proved decisive in bringing about better relations between London
ifn
and Vichy." The French victory at Dakar provided a new framework for 
the negotiaions with the British that were to ensue.
Throughout the period following Dakar, unofficial dipolmatic contact 
was maintained between Vichy and London. By the end of September the 
strain between them was easing. Informal exchanges had been taking place
during September at Madrid between the British Ambassador to Spain, Sir
68 69Samuel Hoare and his French counterpart, Count Renom de la Baume. Af­
ter a brief deterioration immediately following Dakar negotiations between 
the two were resumed and continue until the middle of November. As Hoare 
put it "Madrid became a clearing house for French information and Anglo-
'’tanger, Gamble. p. 86.
^Farmer, Dilemma, p. 193.
^White, Seeds, p. 199.
68Sir Samuel Hoare served as a Conservative M.P. from I9I0 to 1944.
He was Foreign Secretary in 1935 until forced to resign over a secret a- 
greement with Laval regarding Ethiopia. He served as Ambassador to Spain 
From 1940 to 1944. Created First Viscount Templewood in 1944.
697M. de la Baume was a career diplomat in the French Foreign Service. 
Served as Vichy Ambassador to Spain until he was removed for his British 
leanings. Preoccupied with bettering Vichy-British relations.
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70French discussions." Cause for negotiation was given impetus by the re­
ception in Madrid on 26 September of an ultimatum issued by Admiral Darlan 
demanding British non-interferance in the breaking of the blockade and the 
recapturing of dissident colonies. Although Darlan had acted without author­
ization and the ultimatum was officially withdrawn, the incident made the
British realize that some actions had to be taken to prevent the recurrence
71of such threats and the possibility of their being implemented.' London
at first was noncommittal, so much so that Hoare remarked: "I am being used
as the principal channel for communication with it (Vichy) and I own I am
72completely baffled as to what London wants." Vichy supplied the initiative.
On 1 October Hoare received a message from Baudouin stating that if 
the British government did not wish to drive France completely into Germ­
an hands she must allow for an easing of the blockade to allow needed sup­
plies to reach France. If these supplies were seized by the Germans 
(Britain’s main worry), the French Foreign Minister stated, then "the
French Government would be transferred to Morocco and France would be
73once again united with the United Kingdom against Germany." Baudouin 
stressed that he was issuing this communication to eradicate anti- Bri­
tish feeling in France and to make it possible for France and Great Bri-
7ktain to continue together for the final.victory. The British government
^^Viscount Templewood, Ambassador on a Special Mission. (London: Collins, 
P* Hereafter cited as Templewood. Mission.
^Bytier, F.F.P., pp. 9^-95.
721 / Templewood, Mission, p. 86.
73f>Scbmitt, Accords. p. 39.
^De Gaulle, Call: Doc., p. *K).
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replied that, if it was understood by Vichy that it (Great Britain) would
retaliate against any further attacks.like the air raid on Gibraltar and
that it could not withdraw its support from de Gaulle, then it was pre-
75pared to enter discussions. These discussions would then turn on three 
points: the necessity to retain control of the Gaullist colonies to keep 
them from falling into German hands; the possibility of resuming trade ex­
changes between unoccupied France and her colonies; and the necessity of
76keeping the French fleet out of Axis hands, Britain would only enter 
into negotiations on theses points if it was certain that France was act­
ing independently of Germany and would show a more cooperative attitude 
77toward Britain.' The Vichy government replied to these proposals stat­
ing that, while it welcomed the British overtures, it could not undertake 
negotiations on the conditions set forth. It did, however, assure the 
British govemraent that steps were being taken to secure the fleet and
that the Vichy government sincerely desired the setting up of some kind
9o
of trade modus vivendl with Britain. Hoare was instructed to reply 
orally to this in a negative manner but to convey to the French ambass­
ador that the British government was still willing to begin discussions
79immediately in Madrid and to "examine any concrete French proposals." 
Nothing definite emerged from this exchange of proposals, due mainly to
?^De Gaulle, Call: Doc., p. 41.
"^Schmitt, Accords. p. 40 
^ D e  Gaulle, Call: Doc.. p. 41.
' 78Ibid.. pp. 43-44.
79'Templewood, Mission, p 89.
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the growing internal strife at Vichy.
If negotiaions had been left up to de la Baume, a working arrange­
ment between France and Great Britain could have been reached. But the
power struggle at Vichy prevented him from obtaining any clear answers
80to the various proposals. On 28 October Laval replaced Baudouin as 
Foreign Minister, thus diminishing any chance of success for the Madrid 
negotiations. Since Laval was striving for closer agreements with Germ­
any he did not want to compromise his position by conducting relations
with Britain. In any case he remained fundamentally opposed to any of-
81ficial or unofficial agreement with the British.” Shortly after Laval’s 
accession as Foreign Minister, de la Baume was transferred from Madrid to 
a minor post in Bern. His replacement, Pietri, was more disposed to fol­
low Laval’s German oriented policy. The chance for the formation of pro-
82fitable relations left Madrid with de la Baume.
The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax,8-̂ was greatly disappointed 
but renewed his intentions to establish some working relationship with 
Vichy. He became more willing to accept verbal promises from Vichy about 
the disposition of the French fleet and the Empire. Recognizing the firm 
ally he had in de la Baume, Halifax proposed sending an unofficial mission
80Templewood, Mission, p. 87.
81Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 99.
Qo
Templewood, Mission, p. 90.
8W  Halifax (Edward Wood) served as Conservative M.P. 1910-1925.
As Lord Irwin, served as Governor General of India 1926-31. Became leader 
of House of Lords in 1935 and was appointed Foreign Secretary in 1938 and 
supported appeasement policy. Served as Ambassador to the United States 
19̂ 0-19̂ 6.
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to Bern to continue negotiations with the former Ambassador. Laval would 
not agree to any such contact being renewed. Halifax made clear his de­
termination to continue working for an agreement with Vichy government in
84his statement: 'We have not desired to b u m  our boats with/Vichy."
While discussions were still in progress Vichy provided another dip- 
lomatic initiative,/ the mission of Professor Louis Rougier. The mission 
was totally conceived and enacted by Rougier and was in no way official.
Early in September Rougier sent a telegram to an acquaintance in London, 
Professor Lionel Robbins, a professor of economics and an advisor in the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare. In this telegram Rougier requested that 
Robbins use his influence to have the blockade lifted. Robbins replied
by inviting Rougier to come to London and present his own case to the
86 / government. Rougier proposed the idea to Petain of holding informal
discussions with the British in the hopes of clearing up some of the pro-
O iy
blems associated with the blockade and the status of the French Navy.
Petain, endorsed the plan,saying: "So you want to go to London, what a
88good idea! Do tell the British that I bear them no grudge." Petain 
could have had several reasons for allowing Rougier to go to London. He 
may have wanted to use the mission as a counter-balance to Laval's
^vtier. F.F.P..' pp. 93-99.
8^Louis Rougier was a Professor of Political Philosophy and Economics 
at the University of Besancon. Served basically as a messenger from Vichy 
to London, Madrid, and Algiers. He was very impressed with his own importance.
86$rtier, F.F.P., p. 100.
^Garcon. P.M. II. p. 679.
88Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 100.
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collaborative intentions or, more probably, to try to ease the economic
89difficulties brought on by the British blockade. All news of the mis-
90sion was kept from Laval. The Marshal’s intentions were and are a 
source of great controversy but, in any case, Rougier did go to London,
91although he was entrusted with no official powers of negotiation.
Upon arriving in London on 22 October, Rougier met with both Hal­
ifax and Churchill. The results of these meetings were set down in an 
informal "Gentleman's Agreement." There were two interpretations of this 
agreement, Rougier's and the British government's, Rougier contended that 
he and Churchill had agreed to a protocol which included provisions that: 
1)Britain would restore the integrity of the French empire after the war 
if France did not aid the Axis; 2)Britain would authorize the transport 
of colonial produce to France; 3)Britain would make no further incursions 
into the French empire; 4)Britain would force de Gaulle to make no more 
radio attacks on Petain; 5)France would not try to recapture the Gaullist 
colonies; 6)France would cede no bases to the Axis; 7)France would re­
enter the war when Britain could supply enough troops; and 8)France would
92scuttle the fleet rather than let it fall into Axis hands. Added to 
Rougier's version in the British version was the point that Britain re­
served the right to support the Gaullist colonies. Omitted were the pro­
visions to raise the blockade, cease the radio attacks, and restore the
89 *Jean Fernet, "Deposition of Admiral Fernet in the Petain Trial: The
Rougier Mission," in Hoover Institute. F.D.G.O.. Vol. II, p. 933. Here­
after cited as Fernet, "Deposition."
^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 100.
giCole, Laval, p. 121.
^Aron, Vichy Regime, pp. 221-222.
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the integrity of the French empire at the conclusion of the war. The 
British emphasized that the agreement was not an official protocol but 
merely a statement of conditions which might constitute a preliminary
the British government that France would conclude no separate peace or 
cede any bases to the Axis seems to suggest that the "Gentleman's Agree­
ment" had not been ratified. If it had then the British would have al-
Qtj,ready had the Marshal’s assurances and would have required no more.
Again, however, the appearance of an agreement based on Rougier's inter­
nepretation was sufficient to convince Vichy that one did, in fact, exist.
At the very least, from the Vichy point of view, the interviews Rougier
96had with British leaders "justified great hopes."7 On 21 November the
British Consul General in Geneva received a telegram from the British
government confirming, in principle, the British interpretation of the
97"conversation" held with Rougier. Whether thay had ratified the agree-
98ment or not the British government respected its terms. Relations 
between Vichy and London did improve. Some food shipments from North
^Fernet, "Deposition," p. 93^.
9h 1Schmitt, Accords. pp. 93-9^.
98arrangement for a Franco-British modus vivendi.
Whether or not an official agreement was ratified is a difficult 
question to answer. A letter from Petain to Halifax in December assuring
977fAron, Vichy Regime, p. 222.
^Georges Bonnet, Q.uai d'Orsay (Isle of Man: Times Press, 1965), p. 
30l. Hereafter cited as Bonnet, Q.uai d'Orsav.
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Africa -were allowed to pass to France and there were no further attacks
99on French colonies. This -unofficial rapprochement was, however, in 
serious jeopardy from its inception, for Laval was using his newly ac­
quired office as foreign minister to increase his personal power and 
further his goal of collaboration with Germany at the expense of the 
Anglo-French detente.
99 _ ̂Langer, Gamble. p. 89.
CHAPTER IV
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF LAVAL: 28 OCTOBER-13 DECEMBER 194-0
On 28 October Pierre Laval was named foreign minister, ostensibly
as a reward for his part in the discussions at Montoire between himself,
Petain, and Hitler on 22-24- October. Laval met Hitler on 22 October as
the Fxlhrer was enroute to a meeting with Franco. He was immediately won
over by the Nazi leader.* Laval wasted little time in informing Hitler
of his policy goals and stated that he "regarded collaboration as the
2only possible policy defeated France could take toward Germany." His
attitudes toward the British were again pronounced: "As a Frenchman, I
acan only say that I desire with all uy heart a British defeat."-^ Hitler
appeared well-disposed to such proclamations, although time was to prove
that seeking positive results or granting concessions were not parts of
that disposition. As Laval testified at Petainfs trial, there had been
nothing definite decided at Montoire and the discussions only served to
Lconfirm the modus vivendi of the Armistice. At that time, however, 
Laval saw the talks as a clear vindication of his policies, the pursuit 
of which would lead to great personal accomplishments in the field of
Aron, Vichy Regime, p. 216.
^Langer, Gamble. p. 90.
3<Aron, Vichv Regime, p. 215.
Bonnet, Q.uai d ’Orsav. p. 302.
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Franco-German relations.^
Two days later, on 2b October, 'Petain met with Hitler, now returning 
from his exasperating session with Franco. The main areas *dth which 
Petain hoped the meeting would deal were P.O.W.'s, occupation costs, De­
marcation Line abuses, and economic problems, especially those dealing 
with the acquisition of food supplies for France.^ He also wished to
7clarify or renegotiate any points raised in Hitler's meeting with Laval.' 
The reason for this latter desire was that the Marshal was less convinced 
than Laval about the overriding necessity of collaboration with Germany 
to the exclusion of relations with Britain. This view was shortly there­
after expressed in a letter from Petain to Weygand in which the Marshal 
stressed the need for maintaining a "prudent equilibrium" between the two
g
areas of policy.
Petain accepted, at Montoire, the principle of collaboration but not
any specifics. As he said in a radio broadcast on 30 October:
Collaboration has been envisaged between our two 
countries. I have accepted the principleQof it. The 
conditions of it will be discussed later.
Later he told H. Freeman Matthews, the United States1 charge at Vichy,
that the kind of collaboration he foresaw was "only economic collaboration
and in no sense military aid to Germany in her war against Britain, nor
cession of b a s e s . I n  any event, claimed Petain, collaboration would
^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 165.’
^Ibid.. p. 16b.
7'Warner, Laval, p. 235.
8Schmitt, Accords, p. 80.
^rtier, F.F.P.. p. 16b.
10hanger, Gamble, p. 101.
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not effect the sovereignty of France, which obliged and compelled her to
11defend the empire against any aggression, German or British. The Mar­
shal's inability to convey these feelings to the French nation as a whole,
or to the British and Americans, caused in a large part the "Appalling
12crisis of conscience that Vichy imposes on public opinion." It also 
served to confuse the relations of Vichy with both Germany and Great Bri­
tain.
Manifestations of the new spirit of Franco-German collaboration were 
not long in coming. They were decidedly one-sided in Germany's favor.
To obtain the confidence of the Germans and to show his good will, Laval 
made many economic concessions. The most important and damaging of these 
were the cession of the French owned Bor copper mines in Yugoslavia to 
Germany and the forced return of the Belgian gold reserves, entrusted to 
the Banque de France since the outbreak of the war and then transferred 
to Dakar for safe keeping. Returning the gold to the Belgian government 
in Belgium was tantamount to handing it over to the Reichsbank since the
13Germans would and did have no trouble seizing the gold after the transfer.
Thsi latter concession of Laval was, as Haider said, "nothing but a legal
14form of extortion."
Also accepted by French collaborationists, Laval, Darlan, de Brinon, 
and Huntziger, now Secretary of State for War, was a plan to invade and 
recapture' the West African colony of Chad from de Gaulle's Free French
^Sjamer, Laval, p. 240.
12Aron, Vichv Regime, p. 225.
^Hytier, F.F.P.. pp. 168-1 ?1.
14Haider, Journal. V, p. 43.
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forces. This agreement was based on a German threat to step in unless
between the planning and execution stages of the operation were, however, 
to prevent it from being implemented.
The French received nothing in return for these coneessions. The De­
marcation Line remained as difficult to cross, the Wiesbaden negotiations 
remained as useless, the French government was not allowed to return to 
Paris, the occupation costs were not reduced, and most insulting and de­
moralizing of all, a new wave of expulsions from Lorraine was begun.
These situations appeared to all but the most ardent collaborationists as 
a manifesto of German intentions, little moderated by Montoire, and as a 
direct negative reply to Laval’s intentions of good-will and collaboration.
Also occurring during Laval’s reign as foreign minister, although un­
beknown to and in spite of him, was a secret agreement between Petain and 
the British regarding the blockade. The agents for this agreement were 
Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretaiy, and an old personal friend
of his, Jacques Chevalier, the Vichy Secretaiy General of Public Instruc-
17tion. The initiative came from the British who, learning of the Mon­
toire meetings and fearing the consequences of closer Franco-German col­
laboration, became greatly alarmed. They consequently determined to es­
tablish more amicable relations with Vichy, if for no other reason than 
to offset any possible collaborative agreements that may have been made
1<the French reasserted their control over the colonies. Events occurring
. *%alder, Journal. V, p. k3.
l7Ibid.. p. 1(&
at Montoire. Not being prescient and thus not knowing that the Montoire 
meetings had been devoid of practical importance, the British felt it nec­
essary to try to negate or neutralize any new: pro-German feelings in
... . 18 Vichy.
Halifax therefore undertook to contact Chevalier and make proposals 
for the basis of an agreement. On h December Chevalier received Pierre 
Dupuis, the Canadian charge, who was bearing a personal message from Hal­
ifax. The message, as read to Chevalier by Dupuis, stated:
Lord Halifax desires to re-establish contact through you 
as an intermediary. It is to yougpersonally that he turns 
and it is on you that he relies.
Dupuis then proceeded to give the. text of Halifax* message:
Please tell our French friends that we are in an extremely 
delicate situation. We cannot leap into each others arms.
A state of artificial tension must be maintained between 
our French friends and cursives. But behind this front of 
disagreement we must agree.
He then stated that all the British wished was that the French cede no 
air or naval bases to the Germans. Formally, the British asked that the 
French: protect their fleet, protect their colonies, and make no attempt 
to regain control of the Gaullist colonies. If the French met these con­
ditions the British were prepared to ease the blockade to allow food sup­
plies and essential products, namely wheat, peanuts, and sheep in the first 
category, and petroleum products in the second, to reach France, provided 
that they not pass through or into German hands. Most of all, concluded 
Dupuis, any agreement must be made and kept in absolute silence and secrecy,
t 18Eytier, F.F.P.. pp. 96-97.
19Jacques Chevalier, "Deposition of M. Chevalier in the Petain Trial" 
in Hoover Institute, F.D.C-.O.. Vol. II, p. 936. Hereafter cited as Chev­
alier, "Deposition."
20.
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for if the Germans learned of the Franco-British intimacy they would 
most certainly invoke Article IX of the Armistice allowing them to inter­
vene in North Africa if the strictest terms of the Armistice were not met. 
At that time Britain was not prepared to reply to such intervention.
On the following day Chevalier communicated the suggestions to the
Marshal who, though desiring more specific information on those points
dealing with the colonies, approved the plan. His only reservation was
that the massage should be changed to read "a state of artificial coldness"
instead of "a state of artificial tension" existed between Britain and
France. He then told Chevalier: "No one is more ready than I am to agree
21to the English demands..." Later on the same day, 5 December, Chevalier 
and Dupuis met and drafted the agreement in the form agreed on by Petain.
On the morning of 6 December, this final draft was submitted to the 
Marshal, who agreed on all points. On the following day Dupuis departed 
for London and en the evening of 9 December sent a coded message to Chev­
alier stating "All goes well," indicating, as through their prior under-
22standing, that the British government accepted the agreement. The final 
terms of the agreement were that: a state of "artificial coldness" rather 
than a state of "artificial tension" existed between and would be main­
tained by London and Vichy; a status quo in the colonies- would be respected 
with the provision that at some later date the dissident colonies would 
revert to the French empire; Petain and Vichy would at no time surrender 
either the fleet or colonies to the Axis; the British would refrain from 
making radio broadcasts interfering with the internal affairs of France;
?1Chevalier, "Deposition," p. 936. 
22Ibid.. p. 937.
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the British would consider food shipments from the French colonies to
metropolitan France as coastal shipping, and other matters concerning
the blockade would be discussed later by specialists in Madrid; and
French troops in the French empire would protect the territory from all
23attacks, from wherever they might originate.
As in the Rougier affair, much controversy has arisen as to whether
the agreement was actually and officially confirmed and ratified by both
parties. One thing the Halifax-Chevalier compact did prove was that, -since
this latter agreement dealt with basically the same points as the Rougier
"Gentleman's Agreement," this latter agreement had not been confirmed by
the parties involved. It was, more likely, the official culmination of
oh.the unofficial Rougier negotiations. In all probability, however, due
to the pressing need for secrecy, the Halifax-Chevalier accord was not
officially confirmed or ratified. As Chevalier stated, however, it "came
into effect immediately, as all the services having to do with the matter
can testify." Maritime traffic was re-established on a large scale from
colonial to metropolitan France. The straits of Gibraltar was made free
for passage by French ships, those carrying personnel and equipment to
Dakar, those with English permits, or "navicerts," carrying fuel and diesel
2 6oil to and from North Africa, and those carrying essential food supplies. 
According to Admiral Marquis, engaged in bringing supplies to France and
^Schmitt, Accords. pp. 103-104.
OhIbid^. p. 99.
. ^Chevalier, "Deposition," p. 937.
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ignorant of the agreement:
...everything went off as if there were a sort of tacit 
accord on the sea between the French and English, since 
our convoys were going through Gibraltar.. .British pat- 
rolboats continued to signal 'bon voyage1 and to make 
gestures of politeness.
From the late autumn of 1940 to the autumn of 1942, 2000 French ships 
in 600 convoys passed Gibraltar without interference. On shipping lanes 
not included in the agreement, forty per cent of French tonnage x-ras cap-2g
tured. Chevalier declared, in a general sense, that "the agreement was
carried out for the greatest good...both of France and of England."2^ It
was good for France because it made it possible to avoid starvation and
the paralysis of industry by permitting foodstuffs and petroleum products
30to pass through the blockade. It was good for England because of the
31solemn promise of Petain to protect the fleet, and, because of the sec­
recy with which the agreement was made and kept, the Germans were not given 
a pretext for intervening in North Africa. The British determination to 
maintain the agreement was made evident by their frequent dispatches, 
through American diplomatic agents and Dupuis, exhorting the French to 
continue their resistance to German demands. Temporarily, at least, ac­
cording to Chevalier, Franco-British relations continued in the most cordial
27«ytier, F.F.P.. p. 107.
28Ibid.
2^Chevalier, "Deposition," p. 937.
3°Ibid.
31This promise was kept on 27 November, 1942 when the French fleet 
was scuttled to prevent it from falling into the hands of the oncoming 
Germans. Ibid.
32manner." The beginning of I9W  saw all the signs of the recognition
33of a- detente in London and Vichy.
As stated above, these negotiations -were kept secret from Laval.
There is little doubt that, given his intense desire for collaboration 
■with Germany and his hatred of the British, he would have tried, had he 
learned of the Dupuis mission, to scuttle the negotiations at their incep­
tion. As it turned out, however, the reverse proved to be the immediate 
case. The success of the negotiations and the beneficial results of the 
implementation of the agreement provided great impetus to and incentive 
for the anti-Laval faction of the Vichy government.
•^Chevalier, "Deposition," p. 938. 
^Cobban, "Vichy," p. 381.
CHAPTER V
THE FALL OF LAVAL: 13 DECEMBER, 1^0-6 FEBRUARY, 1^1
At a meeting of the full cabinet at eight o ’clock on the evening of 
13 December Petain asked for the resignations of every member of the cab­
inet. Only two, those of M. Ripert and Pierre Laval were accepted. The 
dismissal of Ripert was inconsequential, that of Laval was not, for it 
provoked a two month crisis that revealed "the fundamental attitudes of 
the Petain government toward problems of foreign policy."* The reasons 
for this seemingly sudden upheaval in the Vichy power structure were num­
erous and complex. The most obvious cause was the personal dislike of 
Petain for Laval and his methods of work. Their relationship had been 
only a business alliance from the beginning since Petain needed Laval's
political abilities and Laval, in turn, needed the path to power provided
2toy the Marshal. The two were, however, "fundamentally incompatible."
There was also the matter of the personal animosities, jealousies,
and ambitions of the other cabinet members, especially Baudouin and Darlan.
Also used by the anti-collaboration faction to discredit Laval in the
3Marshal's eyes was his (Laval's) part in promoting the Chad affair.
These reasons were only superficial and secondary. The basic cause was,
*Hvtier. F.F.P.. p. 222.
^Warner, Laval, p. 258.
\ron, Vichy, p. 232.
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instead, the failure of Laval’s policy of collaboration, especially after 
supposedly taking new meaning and direction from the Montoire meetings. 
Laval’s failure to obtain tangible results from the "understanding” reached 
at Montoire was exacerbated by his part on the Belgian gold and the Bor 
mines surrenders. The expulsions of the Lorrainers was the final humili­
ation brought about by Laval in the "new spirit" of Montoire. As P/tain 
told Baudouin on 8 December: "I am sick and tired of Pierre Laval^s policy 
...Montoire is a failure which we cannot conceal.” As General Huntziger 
told the head of the German military administration, General Steulpnagel 
who, in turn, reported to Berlin:
one of the reasons for Laval’s downfall was the fact 
that as a result of our own (German) vacillating at- ? 
titude Laval was unable to show any tangible results.
As the hope that Laval might wring some concessions from the Germans
faded so did Laval's prestige and power at and usefulness to Vichy.
The dismissal of Laval was not a matter undertaken unhesitatingly by 
Petain, for the possibility of German reprisals had to be considered. The 
only way to prevent a dangerously adverse German reaction was to replace 
Laval with(a Foreign Minister acceptable to the Germans. He also had to 
be acceptable to Petain, the French people, and the British. The only 
candidate who met all the requirements was Pierre-Etienne Flandin.^ He 
was a political rightist and had supported the "national revolution" of
^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 22?. 
^Haider, Journal. V, p. ?2.
Pierre-Etienne Flandin was a leader of the French Left Republican 
Party. He was Premier of France from 193^ to 1935.
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10 July. He had been a strong advocate of a Franco-British alliance 
prior to the outbreak of war and had gained a reputation as an Anglophile. 
He became an appeaser after Munich and became known as the man who had 
sent a telegram of congratulation to Hitler after the Munich conference.
He had opposed the war in 1939 but voted for all military appropriations 
necessary to prosecute the war once it was declared. After the Armistice 
he had advocated a limited form of collaboration with Germany. He had 
had some contact with Abetz in Paris during the Summer of 1940 and was'
Q
well thought of by the German Ambassador. He was, more importantly,
Oacceptable to Berlin.
The "conspirators" in Laval’s dismissal awaited the German reaction 
in a state of "anxious confusion. "*^ They planned nothing past the actual 
dismissal and their future depended, to a great degree, on how much imp­
ortance the Germans had placed on Laval as a channel for negotiations. 
Preliminary reactions began filtering in to Vichy by 14- December. Darlan 
and General Laure, a personal friend and confidant of Petain!s, went to 
Paris on that day and met with an incensed Abetz. The German Ambassador, 
who had placed so much faith in negotiations with Laval, attacked the "con­
spirators, " especially Weygand who, he claimed, had engineered Laval"s 
overthrow.** On 16 December Abetz, accompanied by well-armed S.S. guards,
7Efertier, F.F.P., pp. 229-231.
^.S. Dept. of State, D^G^P.P.. X, p. 581. 
ôHaider, Journal. V, p. 70.
*Vtier, JUFJP., p. 233.
**Halder, Journal. V, p. 84.
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went to Vichy to protest the dismissal and to demand Laval’s immediate
re-instatement. The next day Abetz met with Petain and Darlan. The
meeting was interrupted by Laval who burst in and showered a stream of
12violent abuse on the Marshal. Abetz was shocked by this lack of res­
pect and began to understand Petain’s motives for dismissing Laval. After 
this episode Abetz was more tailing to accept compromises, such as the
formation of a "directorate," although he still wished Laval to be in-
13eluded in any government.
A "directorate" consisting of Darlan, Flandin, and Huntziger was 
formed shortly thereafter. Flandin, however, remained adamantly opposed 
to the return of Laval. He was, however, becoming more willing to make 
verbal concessions to the Germans on other points. Flandin insisted that
Laval's absence need have no bearing on Franco-German relations and stated
on 2k December that the new French government "never had envisaged a mod­
ification of the policy which it is pursuing with foreign powers and
ILnotably with Germany." The matter had evolved, in Flandin's mind, into 
a question of the independence and sovereignty of the French government.
To give in to demands to bring Laval back would be to surrender these al­
ready precarious vestiges of the Third. Republic and to become further in­
dentured to Germany.
Germanyls initial responses were to close the Demarcation Line again
15to North-South traffic and further to restrict the Scapini mission.
l2Garcon, P.M.. I, p. 552.
, l3Hytier, F.F.P.. pp. 235-236.
U Ibid.. p. 238.
■70
Laval' importance to Hitler, or rather the lack of it, was illustrated.
by Mussolini who, having called Berlin to find out about the French cri-
16sis, stated: "the Germans don't seem too concerned about it." Ribben-
trop, demonstrating his contempt of and indifference to Laval, told Ciano
that he had planned to use a proposed meeting with him (Laval) to "water 
17down his wine." While not caring a great deal about Laval personally,
18the Germans used his dismissal as a pretext to refuse future concessions.
As Hitler said in a staff conference on 8-9 January: "We are no longer
iobound by any obligations toward France." 7 Claiming that the Laval crisis
had destroyed all hope of collaboration, the O.K.W. directed the Armistice
Commission to use the terms of the Armistice as the sole foundation for
relations with France until such time as Vichy provided the initiative to
20re-establish more congenial ties. Hitler did, however, view the crisis
as being serious enough to order the preparations for the occupation of 
21all of France. The threat of a military revolt in the occupied zone was 
also perceived and the tanks in Paris were ordered to make "ready for ac­
tion. "22
Concerning the return of Laval to the French'government, Hitler was
*^Ciano, Diaries, p. 323.
17Ciano, Dio. Papers, p. *K)7.
18Garcon, P.M.. II, pp. 1098-1102.
*%alder, Journal. V. p.
2GU.S. Dept, of State, D.G.F.P.. XII, pp. 98-99.
2iUlrich von Hassell, Diaries (New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 19^7),
p. 162.
22Halder . Journal. V. p. 7*K ^
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in no hurry. Abets was instructed to prevent Laval from returning to the
unoccupied zone and to prevent him from reaching any agreement with the
23leaders of the Vichy government. Hitler wanted to keep Laval in reserve
as a threat to Petain and to form a future French government in case "Wey-
2M-gand goes over toothe British and de Gaulle. •' Laval did manage to meet 
with Petain and Darlan, the latter of whom was now making his move for 
power and who offered Laval a the chic al ministry in his new government in 
reward for his backing. Encouraged by Darlan and Abetz, the opinion that 
the Germans would not talk to Flandin was growing at Vichy. It soon be­
came apparent, due to this opinion and Flandin!s poor health, that he had 
to be replaced. In early February Darlan became Vice-Premier. The whole 
episode had simply paved the way for his takeover. Like Montoire, the dis­
missal of Laval changed nothing. The policy of collaboration was merely
25to be pursued and implemented by a different man, Darlan.
23Eytier, F.F.P.. p. 2k6.
2^Halder, Journal. V, p. 98, 
25Hytier, F.F.P.. pp. 222, 2^-246.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The nine month period of Vichy’s foreign policy, June, i9^0-February,
19W ,  witnessed a broad spectrum of dipolmatic, political, and military
activity. Its relations with Germany and Great Britain, although seemingly
chaotic and contradictory, had certain constant themes, attitudes and goals.
Both Germany and Great Britain had specific policy aims regarding France,
which in turn had specific counter-aims. Germany wanted to "exploit the
economic potential (of France) in the service of the German war economy,"*
and to "get out of France, through siezure or purchase at infinitesimal
2prices the materials of use for the German armament." Great Britain 
wanted to keep the French navy and Empire from falling control of the Ax­
is, either by having them join the British and continue the fighting or 
by rendering them harmless. All the policies of these two nations were 
directed toward obtaining these ends. Vichy France, militarily defeated, 
morally, physically, and economically exhausted, and politically unstable 
was forced into the nearly impossible task of reconstmxcting its own soc­
iety while at the same time dealing with the demands of its conqueror and 
its.former ally.
V.G.F.P.. X, p. 129.
2Potts, Armistice, p. 5^.
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The monumental task of rebuilding French society took immediate prior­
ity. The Vichy government was faced with the problems resulting from the 
disrupted economy and the contigent problem of unemployment, the numerous 
French, Belgian, and German refugees who had flooded into the unoccupied 
zone, the physical destruction caused by the fighting, and the moral and 
psychological degeneration caused by the disastrous defeat. To reach sol­
utions to these problems the Vichy government had to seek the aid and ap­
proval of the German occupation administration which to a great degree 
controlled the economic and human resources of France. The main channels 
through which negotiation on these points' could be undertaken were the 
"official" one of the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden and the 
"unofficial" one of the German "Ambassador" in Paris, Otto Abetz.
The only other attempt at negotiations made outside these channels 
during this period was the abortive Montoire conference. This meeting 
was one of the very few instances in which Petain engaged in direct talks 
with the Germans. For the most part direct negotiations were carried on 
by his subordinates Laval, Huntziger and Barlan. Flandin, during his 
brief term of office, did not meet with German agents except for a few 
brief talks with Abetz after the dismissal of Laval. All of these "dip­
lomats" favored some form or working with, or collaborating with the Ger­
mans to attempt to solve the problems of France. There were, in fact, 
very few officials of the Vichy regime, most notably Weygand, who did 
not-logically favor some form of collaboration with Germany. This was, 
indeed, the only method by which solutions to the critical problems could 
be reached. There were, however, different ideas as to the extent and 
form of this collaboration, 'and it was this difference of opinion that 
led to Laval’s dismissal in December, 19^0.
The terra ncollaboration" implied a relationship of at least partial 
reciprocity of action. In the particular case of Franco-German relation 
however, this reciprocity did not apply equally to both parties. Germany 
was in a position to dominate the relationship, either by reward or by re­
tribution. The Vichy government had few means of pressure at hand to use 
in negotiating with the Germans. It did, however, maintain control of the 
fleet and the empire and what minor successes the French did have can be 
attributed to German desires to avoid any action drastic enough to drive 
the fleet and empire into the British camp. The Germans1 main goal con­
cerning the empire was to "...secure the French colonial empire against
an Anglo-American attact and against de Gaulle, and to exploit the Franco-
3African area and its bases for German naval, air, and military forces."
The importance of and respect for the fleet was illustrated throughout 
the summer of 19^0.
The events of the period, the attack at Mers-el-Kebir, the defection 
of French West and Equatorial African colonies to the de Gaulle movement, 
and the Dakar raid showed that French loyalty to Vichy and the Armistice 
was not unconditional and could be withdrawn if France were treated too 
harshly by the Germans. The conciliatory attitude of the Germans changed 
later in the period as shown by Hitler"s statement of 9 January, 19W-:
"If France becomes troublesome she will have to be crushed completely."^ 
Even then Hitler stressed his regard for the fleet: "Under no circumstance
^O.K.K.. Fuhrer Conf.. I, p. 35. 
^Hytier, F.F.P.. p. 146,
'b.K.K.. Fuhrer Conf.. I (I9W), p. 3.
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must the French fleet be allowed to get away from us; it must be either
captured or destroyed.Once this attitude came to predominance in Ber-
in, Vichy France had little to entice Germany into active collaboration.
To the Germans collaboration came to be compared to a "waggon f~sic~~) driver
r>who whips his mules crying 'collaboration, collaboration.'"' It came to
be used by the Germans as a lever to obtain what they wanted by appearing,
through the definition of the term, to reciprocate. It was, in this appli-
8cation, also used to minimize and nuetralize French protests.
The greatest obstacle to the success of collaboration as a policy in
addition to the previously stated shortcomings of the Vichy system, was
Hitler's overriding hatred and contempt of France. As he stated in Mein
Kamgf: "The German people's irreconcilable mortal enemy is and remains 
oFrance." Political necessity forced him to moderate M s  outward attitudes
during the TMrties. All the wMle, however, he was planning for a war
10 11 with France and England, Germany's "two hateful enemies." Once the
war with France was won Hitler was again obliged to be more conciliatory
toward France than he might otherwise have been because of the presence
and power of the French fleet and empire. He never lost M s  hatred for
the French nor M s  desire to crush and humiliate them as witnessed by
6 O.K.K., Fuhrer Conf.. I (1940), p. 3.
^Ciano, Diaries. p. 560.
Vtier, F.F.P., p. 175.
^Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. p. 902.
^International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals.
42 Vol., (Nuremberg: 1947-1949), pp. 381-391.
11U.S. State Dept. D.G.F.P.. X, p. 129.
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Goebbels statement of 30 April, 19^2: nIf the French knew what the Fuhrer
is one day going to demand of them their eyes in all liklihood would brim 
12over," Collaboration, especially the kind envisioned by Laval after 
Kontoire, was destined to fail, of for no other reason than Hitler’s per­
sonal feelings and attitudes.
The chaotic appearance and, to some degree, reality of the Vichy gov­
ernment and its foreign policy was due in part to the frequent changes in 
high-level personnel. The foreign relations were directed, at various and 
in certain cases coincident times by Baudouin, Laval, Flandin, and Darlan. 
There were also several unofficial agents such as Rougier, de la Baurne, 
Chevalier, and de Brinon carrying on diplomatic relations with Germany or 
Great Britain. The one unifying and catalytic factor was Marshal Petain. 
Except for the case of Laval, all these agents were responsible directly 
to Pdtain who knowingly approved their activities, Laval, the exception, 
was dismissed in part for his failure to keep the Marshal informed of his 
actions. Through Petain, then, the foreign policy of France remained as 
constant as the drastic circumstances would permit.
The Marshal frequently'- and bitterly has been criticized for his seem­
ingly inconsistent, contradictory, and insincere foreign policy. This is 
not fully the case, for he had certain ideas and motives that guided his 
policy and to which he generally adhered. He has been accused of playing 
a double game , or "double jeu," in his relations with Germany and Great 
Britain, and this is partially true. Circumstances would not allow him 
to do otherwise. His relations with Germany and Great Britain were sincere.
*^Louis P. Lochner, ed., The Goebbels Diaries. (Washingtion D.C.:
The Infantry Journal Press, 19^8), p. 198.
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He did not seek to play them off against each other and dealt with each, 
in turn, honestly and directly. One example of this occurred in connection 
with the Kontoire talks and the Rougier mission. Rougier had left for Lon­
don prior to and was engaged in talks there at the time Petain met with
Hitler. At Montoire the Marshal, in effect, forgot about Rougier and dir-
13ected himself totally to the discussions at hand with Hitler. It would 
have been easy and perhaps beneficial for him to use either discussion as 
a lever in the other but he did not.
Petain expressed his feelings and attitudes to Chevalier on 1 Febru­
ary, 1$W, and his statements well illustrated his position regarding the 
supposed "double jeu:"
I do not play a double game. I do not play a double 
game...! have but one. promise to give, and I keep it. I ^  
am Honorable in rry dealings with one side as with the other.
The Marshal explained the reasons he had to deal with both Germany and
Great Britain and stated his preferences:
I am caught between two policies. One is, that of col­
laboration with the English, a policy to which all ny 
preferences go. The other is the rule of the conqueror 
to which I am forced to submit because the conqueror is 
here and because he imposes his ruie on the people whom 
I must defend against him. *
He then stated why he had to be honest with the Germans:
With those on one side I signed the Armistice, and I 
respect the terras of the Armistice. And I do so on 
the expressed and formal desire of the English, who
^^Schmitt, Accords. p. 82. 
^Chevalier, "Deposition," p. 939. 
*̂ Ibid.
say that a rupture of.the Armistice would result in a 
German intervention. °
About his relations with the British Petain claimed:
On the other hand, I am true to the English and friendly 
toward them because within the limits of the field which remains 
open to me, and it is not a very large field, I do everything 
in my power to facilitate their task and to prepare their vic­
tory, which will be our victory as well. But at the same tiros,
I resist to the greatest possible extent the demands of the 
Germans. '
Chevalier then gives an example of the Marshal's stated determination to 
resist major German demands.
In April, 1 9 W , the Germans were trying doggedly to incorporate Al­
sace into the Reich. Petain was just as vehemently opposed. Chevalier, 
as Minister of Public Instruction, had occasion to discuss the matter vdth 
a German art historian reputed to be in Hitler's confidence, Herr Herckmans. 
Herckmans reiterated Germany's demand for Alsace to which Chevalier re­
plied "nothing of that kind can be done. The Kardchal is absolutely im-
18movable on the question of Alsace." Herckmans than proposed compromises
but stated that there would have to be one agreed precondition:
The Mar^chal would have to stop blocking all our de­
mands by complete refusals and would have to: support 
the policy of collaboration, whereas at present he 
always shows himself to be against it. °
✓Herckmans went on to tell Chevalier that in Berlin, Petain was known as 
"Marechal Nein-because he always says no.
^Chevalier, "Deposition," p. 939. 
l7Ibid.
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These were Petain*s guiding beliefs. Other factors did, however, 
enter into the formulation of the policy of Vichy. During the beginning 
of the period covered the outcome of the war was still much in doubt, al­
though a German victory did seem highly probable. Under that circumstance, 
the leaders at Vichy, including Pdtain, deemed it wise and necessary to 
collaborate with Germany, on at least a temporary basis, in economic and 
administrative areas. Military collaboration was avoided or refused by 
Vichy for political and military reasons. If Vichy would have entered 
into any kind of military alliance with Germany, which was highly unlikely 
given the state of the French armed forces, excluding the navy and colonial 
any, the political consequences would have been grave and Vichy would have 
lost much of the little prestige it had managed to retain with the French 
people. Any such reversal of military alliances would have been profit­
able if Germany was the ultimate victor in the larger war.
Toward the beginning of 1 9 W , due to the failure of Sea Lion, the 
German plan to invade England, to materialize, and the arrival of Lend 
Lease destroyers in Britain, the previous positive convictions of a Ger­
man victory at Vichy were being questioned and were slowly fading. French 
public opinion, united in the hatred of the "Boche," also colored Petain's 
attitudes and policy. Negotiation was the key word to Petain, He desired
2ito use it as a temporizing tool to allow France to exist until better times.
Always in his mind was the comparison of the situation of France in 1$&0
with the situation of Prussia after Jena. His hopes for a similar phoenix-
22like rise became an obsession.
2lHytier, F.F.P.. pp. 1^0-149.
22Aron, Vichy Regime.' p. 186.
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In terms of usefullness to this paper all other works pale in the 
light of Hytier's Two Years of French. Foreign Policy. The work is ex­
tremely well documented and thus of great help bibliographically. This 
has to be the authoritative source on the foreign relations of Vichy 
France from 1940-1942. On a subject that invites moral judgments and 
opinions Hytier has retained her scrupulous objectivity throughout. A 
great majority of the footnotes in the work were checked and proved to 
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of the internal machinations of the government as applied to foreign rel­
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Of the biographies, Cole and Warner have provided the best efforts. 
Cole relies on personal accounts and memoirs bibliographically, the result 
of which was a well-integrated and detailed personalized account of Laval. 
Warner provides an excellent character study of Laval, especially in regard 
to his attempts at foreign relations with Germany.
Toynbee's Survey of International Affairs is a good starting place 
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icles were included and were of great help. Langer's Our Vichy Gamble 
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on Franco-British and Franco-German relations as well. Shirer's monumen­
tal work was an excellent, minutely detailed account of the political
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